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Abstract
This paper is on the combination of two powerful approaches to uncertain reasoning: logic
programming in a probabilistic setting, on the one hand, and the information-theoretical principle
of maximum entropy, on the other hand. More precisely, we present two approaches to probabilistic
logic programming under maximum entropy. The first one is based on the usual notion of entailment
under maximum entropy, and is defined for the very general case of probabilistic logic programs over
Boolean events. The second one is based on a new notion of entailment under maximum entropy,
where the principle of maximum entropy is coupled with the closed world assumption (CWA) from
classical logic programming. It is only defined for the more restricted case of probabilistic logic
programs over conjunctive events. We then analyze the nonmonotonic behavior of both approaches
along benchmark examples and along general properties for default reasoning from conditional
knowledge bases. It turns out that both approaches have very nice nonmonotonic features. In
particular, they realize some inheritance of probabilistic knowledge along subclass relationships,
without suffering from the problem of inheritance blocking and from the drowning problem. They
both also satisfy the property of rational monotonicity and several irrelevance properties. We finally
present algorithms for both approaches, which are based on generalizations of recent techniques
for probabilistic logic programming under logical entailment. The algorithm for the first approach
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still produces quite large weighted entropy maximization problems, while the one for the second
approach generates optimization problems of the same size as the ones produced in probabilistic
logic programming under logical entailment.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Probabilistic logic programming; Maximum entropy; Conditional constraint; Probabilistic reasoning;
Nonmonotonic reasoning; Algorithms
1. Introduction
A number of recent research efforts are directed towards integrating logic-oriented
and probability-based representation and reasoning formalisms. Probabilistic propositional
logics, whose roots can be traced back to Boole’s book of 1854 “The Laws of Thought”
[7], and their various dialects have been thoroughly studied in the literature (see especially
the work by Nilsson [65], Fagin et al. [20], Dubois and Prade et al. [16,17], Frisch
and Haddawy [22], and the second author [51,52]). Also probabilistic argumentation
systems [28] integrate logic and probability. The extensions of propositional approaches to
probabilistic first-order logics can be classified into first-order logics in which probabilities
are defined over the domain and those in which probabilities are given over a set of
possible worlds (see especially the work by Bacchus et al. [3] and Halpern [29]). The
first ones are suitable for describing statistical knowledge, while the latter are appropriate
for representing degrees of belief. The same classification holds for existing approaches to
probabilistic logic programming. In particular, Ng [61] concentrates on probabilities over
the domain, while Subrahmanian and his group [12,13,62,63] focus on annotation-based
approaches to degrees of belief. Another approach to probabilistic logic programming
with degrees of belief, which is especially directed towards efficient implementations, has
been recently introduced in [50,55]. The following shows a very simple probabilistic logic
program as in [50,55], which expresses that “all penguins are birds” and that “birds have
legs with a probability of at least 0.98”:
P = {(bird(T ) | penguin(T ))[1,1],(
have_legs(T ) | bird(T ))[0.98,1]}.
Nearly all the above approaches of integrating logic and probability are based on the notion
of model-theoretic logical entailment. This notion, however, has often been criticized in
the literature for its inferential weakness. For example, the tight probability interval that
follows under model-theoretic logical entailment from the above program P for “Tweety
has legs, given that Tweety is a penguin” is given by the uninformative interval [0,1]. For
this reason, many recent approaches towards integrating logic and probabilities combine
logic-based formalisms with Bayesian networks [70]. In particular, Poole’s work [72,73]
describes an approach to Horn clause abduction in which probabilities are associated
with hypotheses. It is implemented by a generalization of SLD resolution. Haddawy and
his group [27,64] describe an approach to query processing in first-order probabilistic
knowledge bases by Bayesian network construction and inference. Jaeger’s work [31,32]
goes in a similar direction. There is less closely related work on object-oriented Bayesian
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networks by Koller and Pfeffer [42] and by Laskey and Mahoney [46] where methods
from object-oriented programming languages are used to enable flexible and large-scale
knowledge representation with Bayesian networks.
Another promising way towards stronger entailment relations are the recent approaches
to probabilistic default reasoning with conditional constraints in [57] and to probabilistic
logic programming under inheritance with overriding in [54]. These approaches are based
on new notions of entailment for reasoning with conditional constraints, which are obtained
from the classical notion of logical entailment by adding inheritance with overriding,
using techniques from default reasoning with conditional constraints. For example, under
probabilistic default entailment, the tight probability interval that follows from the above
program P for “Tweety has legs, given that Tweety is a penguin” is given by [0.98,1].
The new notions of entailment have very nice nonmonotonic properties, and they can also
be used in reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief [57]. A companion
paper [56] explores related notions of entailment for conditioning on zero events.
A further way to overcome the inferential weakness of model-theoretic logical
entailment is to use the principle of maximum entropy. In general, the available
probabilistic knowledge does not suffice to completely specify a unique probability
distribution. Rather, it specifies a large set of probability distributions, giving rise to an
inconvenient impreciseness of the inferred probability intervals. Applying the principle
of maximum entropy is a well-appreciated means to improve probabilistic inference,
both from a statistical point of view, and for commonsense reasons [67]. Entropy is
an information-theoretical measure [86] reflecting the indeterminateness inherent to a
distribution. Given some satisfiable set of probabilistic facts and rules, the principle of
maximum entropy chooses as the most appropriate representation the unique distribution,
among all the distributions satisfying those formulas, that has maximum entropy. For
example, under maximum entropy, the above program P entails the probability 0.98
for “Tweety has legs, given that Tweety is a penguin”. Within a rich statistical first-
order language, Grove et al. [26] show that this maximum entropy distribution may be
taken to compute degrees of belief of formulas. Paris and Vencovska [68] investigate the
foundations of consistent probabilistic inference and set up postulates that characterize
maximum entropy inference uniquely within that framework. A similar result was stated
in [36,87], based on optimization theory. Jaynes [34] regarded the principle of maximum
entropy as a special case of a more general principle for translating information into a
probability assignment. One of the authors [39,40] proved it to be the most appropriate
principle for dealing with conditionals (that is, using the notions of the present paper,
ground conditional constraints of the form (ψ|φ)[c, c]), and worked out its relevance also
for qualitative approaches to uncertain reasoning [41].
The main idea of this paper is to elaborate an approach to probabilistic logic
programming that is based on the inferentially powerful notion of entailment under
maximum entropy. We thus follow an old idea that is already stated in the works
by Cheeseman [10] and Nilsson [65], however, lifted to the first-order framework of
probabilistic logic programs, which allow for a more concise representation of probabilistic
knowledge in complex environments than propositional probabilistic knowledge bases. To
our knowledge, the present paper is the first work in the literature on probabilistic logic
programming under maximum entropy.
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Our research in this paper is directed towards an approach to probabilistic logic
programming under maximum entropy, which has nice nonmonotonic properties and at the
same time also nice computational features. At first sight, this project might seem a very
hard task, especially from the computational point of view, since already propositional
probabilistic logics under maximum entropy suffer from efficiency problems (due to an
exponential number of possible worlds involved in the optimization process). In this paper,
however, we will see that this is not the case. In particular, we show that the efficient
approach to probabilistic logic programming in [55], refined by new ideas, and combined
with a new notion of entailment under maximum entropy, can be extended to an efficient
and semantically appealing approach to probabilistic logic programming under maximum
entropy.
More generally, in this paper, we consider the following two approaches to probabilistic
logic programming under maximum entropy:
• Our first approach combines the efficient approach to probabilistic logic programming
in [55] with the classical notion of entailment under maximum entropy. This approach
is defined for the very general case of probabilistic logic programs over Boolean
events. We show that it has very nice nonmonotonic properties. However, it produces
quite large entropy maximization problems.
• Our second approach combines the approach in [55] with a new notion of entailment
under maximum entropy, where the principle of maximum entropy is coupled with the
closed world assumption (CWA) from classical logic programming. This approach is
defined for the more restricted case of probabilistic logic programs over conjunctive
events. It has nearly the same nice nonmonotonic properties as the first approach, but
it has also nice computational features.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We recall the syntax of probabilistic logic programs from [55] and define their
new semantics through the classical notion of entailment under maximum entropy
(or me-entailment) and the new notion of entailment under maximum entropy and
CWA (or mc-entailment). We provide several examples that show the relevance
of probabilistic logic programs in practice, and that give a comparative view on
me-entailment, mc-entailment, and logical entailment. In particular, they show that
there are cases where logical entailment is simply too weak.
• We explore the nonmonotonic behavior of me-entailment, mc-entailment, and logical
entailment in standard benchmark examples from default reasoning from conditional
knowledge bases. It turns out that me- and mc-entailment have very nice properties.
Differently from logical entailment, they both inherit probabilistic knowledge along
subclass relationships, and they ignore irrelevant knowledge. Moreover, they show
neither the problem of inheritance blocking, nor the drowning problem. We also
study the behavior of the three entailment relations in the case of conflicting and
nonconflicting information.
• We explore the general nonmonotonic properties of the notions of me-entailment,
mc-entailment, and logical entailment. Also here, me- and mc-entailment behave
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very nicely. In particular, we show that both me-entailment and logical entailment
satisfy all the postulates of System P [43], while mc-entailment satisfies nearly all
of them. Moreover, all three notions of entailment have the direct inference property.
Furthermore, me- and mc-entailment both satisfy the rational monotonicity property,
and they have some irrelevance and strong irrelevance properties, while logical
entailment is lacking all these properties.
• As for the relationship between me-entailment, mc-entailment, and logical entailment,
we show that both me- and mc-entailment are stronger than logical entailment, and
that they coincide on nonprobabilistic conclusions. Furthermore, all three notions of
entailment are probabilistic generalizations of model-theoretic logical entailment in
classical propositional logics.
• We present algorithms for the problems POSITIVE PROBABILITY (given a probabilis-
tic logic program P and a ground event α, decide whether P has a model Pr with
Pr(α) > 0) and TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE (given a probabilistic logic program P and
a ground conditional event β|α, compute the reals l, u ∈ [0,1] such that (β|α)[l, u] is
a tight logical consequence of P ). They reduce POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT
0-CONSEQUENCE to linear optimization problems, and they make use of the following
techniques for an increased efficiency: (i) making hidden classical knowledge explicit,
(ii) removing vacuous conditional constraints, (iii) removing inactive conditional con-
straints, (iv) decomposing a probabilistic logic program, (v) exploiting classical knowl-
edge, and (vi) clustering possible worlds. Here, (i)–(iii), (v), and (vi) are refinements
of implicit techniques in [55], while (iv) is inspired by similar methods in [19,58].
• We present algorithms for the tasks TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE (respectively, TIGHT
mc-CONSEQUENCE): Given a probabilistic logic program P and a ground condi-
tional event β|α, compute the reals l, u ∈ [0,1] such that (β|α)[l, u] is a tight
me-consequence (respectively, mc-consequence) of P . They reduce these problems
to entropy (respectively, weighted entropy) maximizations subject to a system of lin-
ear constraints, and they make use of the above techniques (i), (ii), and (iv)–(vi) (re-
spectively, the above techniques (i)–(vi)), which are shown to carry over to solving
TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE (respectively, TIGHT mc-CONSEQUENCE). In particular,
this shows that TIGHT mc-CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE are reduced
to two optimization problems of the same size, while TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE is
reduced to a significantly larger optimization problem, since the technique (iii) of re-
moving inactive conditional constraints cannot be applied.
A number of examples throughout the paper shed light on many interesting aspects of
maximum entropy reasoning, and illustrate the presented techniques. In particular, we give
an example of a small probabilistic logic program where the size of the generated system of
linear constraints drops down from 120 linear constraints over 264 ≈ 18×1018 (!) variables
in the naive characterization to 6 linear constraints over 6 (respectively, 7) variables in the
characterization produced by our algorithms for POSITIVE PROBABILITY (respectively,
TIGHT 0- and mc-CONSEQUENCE).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some technical
preliminaries. Section 3 introduces the entailment semantics for probabilistic logic
programs that we consider in this paper. In Section 4, we give some examples that
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show the relevance of probabilistic logic programs in practice. Section 5 then analyzes
the semantic properties of the discussed entailment semantics for probabilistic logic
programs. In Section 6, we give naive algorithms for probabilistic logic programming
under the entailment semantics of this paper. Sections 7–9 then present more sophisticated
techniques. In Section 11, we finally summarize the main results and give an outlook on
future research.
In order to not distract from the flow of reading, some technical details and proofs have
been moved to Appendices A–D.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe the probabilistic background of this work. We
then define the syntax of probabilistic logic programs and of probabilistic queries to
probabilistic logic programs. We next define the meaning of probabilistic queries, using
notions of entailment for probabilistic logic programs, and we finally describe the
probabilistic logic programming tasks that we especially focus on in this paper.
2.1. Probabilistic background
We now briefly describe how first-order logics of probability are given a semantics
in which probabilities are defined over a set of possible worlds (cf. especially the work
by Carnap [8], Gaifman [23], Scott and Krauss [85], and Halpern [29]). We restrict our
considerations to a language of first-order Boolean combinations of conditional constraints
that are implicitly universally quantified and that are interpreted by probabilities over a set
of Herbrand interpretations.
Let Φ be a first-order vocabulary that contains a finite set of predicate symbols and
a finite set of constant symbols (that is, we do not consider function symbols in the
framework of this paper). For technical convenience, we assume that Φ does not contain
the equality symbol. Let X be a set of object variables and bound variables. Object
variables represent elements of a certain domain, while bound variables describe real
numbers in the unit interval [0,1].
An object term is either a constant symbol from Φ or an object variable from X . We
define events by induction as follows. The propositional constants false and true, denoted
⊥ and , respectively, are events. If p is a predicate symbol of arity k  0 from Φ and
t1, . . . , tk are object terms, then p(t1, . . . , tk) is an event (called atom). If φ and ψ are
events, then also ¬φ and (φ ∧ ψ). A conditional event is an expression of the kind ψ|φ
with events ψ and φ. A conditional constraint is an expression of the form (ψ|φ)[l, u] with
real numbers l, u ∈ [0,1] and events ψ and φ. We call ψ its consequent (or head) and φ
its antecedent (or body). We define probabilistic formulas by induction as follows. Every
conditional constraint is a probabilistic formula. If F and G are probabilistic formulas,
then also ¬F and (F ∧ G). We use (F ∨ G), (F ⇐ G), and (F ⇔ G) to abbreviate
¬(¬F ∧ ¬G), ¬(¬F ∧G), and (¬(¬F ∧ G)∧ ¬(F ∧ ¬G)), respectively, where F and
G are either two events or two probabilistic formulas. We eliminate parentheses as usual.
Object terms, events, conditional events, and probabilistic formulas are ground iff they do
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not contain any variables. The notions of substitutions, ground substitutions, and ground
instances of conditional events and probabilistic formulas are canonically defined.
We distinguish between classical and purely probabilistic conditional constraints.
Classical conditional constraints are of the kind (ψ|φ)[1,1] or (ψ|φ)[0,0], while purely
probabilistic conditional constraints are of the form (ψ|φ)[l, u] with l < 1 and u > 0. We
often identify the classical conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[1,1] (respectively, (ψ|φ)[0,0])
with the event ψ ⇐ φ (respectively, ⊥ ⇐ ψ ∧ φ).
We use HBΦ (respectively, HUΦ ) to denote the Herbrand base (respectively, Herbrand
universe) over Φ . In the sequel, we assume that HBΦ is nonempty (that is, Φ has at least a
0-ary predicate symbol, or a predicate symbol and a constant symbol). A possible world I
is a subset of HBΦ . We use IΦ to denote the set of all possible worlds over Φ . A variable
assignment σ maps each object variable to an element of HUΦ , and each bound variable
to a real number from [0,1]. It is extended to object terms by σ(c) = c for all constant
symbols c from Φ . The truth of events φ in I under σ , denoted I |=σ φ, is inductively
defined as follows (we write I |= φ when φ is ground):
• not I |=σ ⊥, and I |=σ ;
• I |=σ p(t1, . . . , tk) iff p(σ(t1), . . . , σ (tk)) ∈ I ;
• I |=σ ¬φ iff not I |=σ φ;
• I |=σ (φ ∧ψ) iff I |=σ φ and I |=σ ψ .
An event φ is true in a possible world I , or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I |=σ φ
for all variable assignments σ . An event φ is logically valid iff φ is true in every possible
world I . A possible world I is a model of a set of events F iff I is a model of all φ ∈ F .
A set of eventsF is satisfiable iff a model of F exists. An event φ is a logical consequence
of F , denoted F |= φ, iff each model of F is also a model of φ. We use F 
|=φ to denote
that F |= φ does not hold.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on IΦ (that is, as IΦ is finite,
a mapping from IΦ to the unit interval [0,1] such that all Pr(I) with I ∈ IΦ sum up
to 1). The probability of an event φ in the probabilistic interpretation Pr under a variable
assignment σ , denoted Prσ (φ), is the sum of all Pr(I) such that I ∈ IΦ and I |=σ φ
(we write Pr(φ) when φ is ground). For events φ and ψ with Prσ (φ) > 0, we then define
Prσ (ψ|φ) = Prσ (ψ∧φ)/Prσ (φ). For ground events φ with Pr(φ) > 0, the conditioning of
Pr on φ, denoted Prφ , is defined by Prφ(I)= Pr(I)/Pr(φ) for all I ∈ IΦ with I |= φ, and
by Prφ(I) = 0 for all other I ∈ IΦ . The truth of a probabilistic formula F in a probabilistic
interpretation Pr under a variable assignment σ , denoted Pr |=σ F , is defined by induction
as follows:
• Pr |=σ (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Prσ (φ)= 0 or Prσ (ψ|φ) ∈ [l, u];
• Pr |=σ ¬F iff not Pr |=σ F ;
• Pr |=σ (F ∧G) iff Pr |=σ F and Pr |=σ G.
A probabilistic formula F is true in a probabilistic interpretation Pr, or Pr is a model
of F , denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr |=σ F for all variable assignments σ . A probabilistic formula
F is logically valid iff F is true in every probabilistic interpretation Pr. A probabilistic
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interpretation Pr is a model of a set of probabilistic formulas F , denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr
is a model of all F ∈ F . A set of probabilistic formulas F is satisfiable iff a model of F
exists.
2.2. Syntax of probabilistic logic programs
A probabilistic logic program P is a finite set of conditional constraints of the form
(ψ|φ)[l, u] where l  u. We use ground(P ) to denote the set of all ground instances of
conditional constraints in P . We use HBP to denote the set of all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ
that occur in ground(P ). A probabilistic query is an expression of the form ∃(β|α)[s, t],
where α and β are two events, and s and t are either two real numbers from [0,1] or two
distinct bound variables from X . A probabilistic query ∃(β|α)[s, t] is object-ground iff α
and β are ground and s, t ∈X .
An event φ is conjunctive iff φ is either  or a conjunction of atoms. A conditional
event ψ|φ is conjunctive (respectively, 1-conjunctive) iff ψ is a conjunction of atoms
(respectively, an atom) and φ is conjunctive. A conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u]
is conjunctive (respectively, 1-conjunctive) iff ψ|φ is conjunctive (respectively, 1-
conjunctive). A probabilistic logic program P is conjunctive iff all F ∈ P are conjunctive.
A probabilistic query ∃(β|α)[s, t] is conjunctive iff β|α is conjunctive.
Conjunctive conditional constraints (ψ|φ)[l, u] with l  u are also called probabilistic
Horn clauses. They are classified into integrity clauses and probabilistic program clauses,
which are of the form (ψ|φ)[0,0] and (ψ|φ)[l, u], respectively, where u > 0. The latter are
divided into probabilistic facts and probabilistic rules, which are of the form (ψ|)[l, u]
and (ψ|φ)[l, u], respectively, where φ 
= .
A classical Horn clause is a classical 1-conjunctive conditional constraint of the form
(ψ|φ)[1,1] or (ψ|φ)[0,0]. A classical logic program is a finite set of classical Horn
clauses. A classical program clause is a classical Horn clause of the kind (ψ|φ)[1,1].
A classical definite logic program is a finite set of classical program clauses. Finally,
classical facts and classical rules are classical program clauses of the form (ψ|)[1,1]
and (ψ|φ)[1,1], respectively, where φ 
= .
2.3. Semantics of probabilistic logic programs
To define the meaning of probabilistic queries to probabilistic logic programs, we first
have to define a notion of entailment for probabilistic logic programs. There are several
different such notions. Each notion of entailment s is associated with a consequence
relation ‖∼s and a tight consequence relation ‖∼stight, which relate probabilistic logic
programs with their entailed conditional constraints.
In order to specify a notion of entailment s, it is sufficient to only define the consequence
relation ‖∼s for the ground case. The tight consequence relation ‖∼stight for the ground case
is then canonically defined by P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff l (respectively, u) is the supremum
(respectively, infimum) of a (respectively, b) subject to P‖∼s (β|α)[a, b]. Furthermore,
the relations ‖∼s and ‖∼stight are naturally extended to the nonground case as follows. For
all probabilistic logic programs P and all conditional constraints (β|α)[l, u], we define
P‖∼s (β|α)[l, u] iff ground(P )‖∼s (β ′|α′)[l, u] for all ground instances β ′|α′ of β|α. We
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define P‖∼s (β|α)[l, u] iff l (respectively, u) is the supremum (respectively, infimum)tight
of a (respectively, b) subject to ground(P ) ‖∼stight (β ′|α′)[a, b] and all ground instances
β ′|α′ of β|α.
We are now ready to define the meaning of probabilistic queries to probabilistic logic
programs under some notion of entailment s. Given a probabilistic query ∃(β|α)[l, u] with
l, u ∈ [0,1] to a probabilistic logic program P , its correct answer substitutions under
s are substitutions θ such that P‖∼s (βθ |αθ)[l, u] and that θ acts only on variables in
∃(β|α)[l, u]. Its correct answer under s is Yes if such a θ exists and No otherwise. Given a
probabilistic query ∃(β|α)[x, y] with x, y ∈X to a probabilistic logic program P , its tight
answer substitutions under s are substitutions θ such that P‖∼stight (βθ |αθ)[xθ, yθ ], that θ
acts only on variables in ∃(β|α)[x, y], and that xθ, yθ ∈ [0,1]. Note that for probabilistic
queries ∃(β|α)[x, y] with x, y ∈ X , there always exist tight answer substitutions (in
particular, object-ground queries always have a unique tight answer substitution).
Observe that we make use of first-order quantifiers in the same way as in standard logic
programming, that is, all probabilistic clauses in a probabilistic logic program are implicitly
assumed to be universally quantified, and probabilistic queries involve the existential
quantifier.
2.4. Problem statements
In this paper, we especially concentrate on the following two important decision and
optimization problems related to probabilistic logic programs (where the vocabulary Φ is
implicitly assumed to be a part of the input):
POSITIVE PROBABILITY: Given a probabilistic logic program P and a ground event φ,
decide whether P has a model Pr such that Pr(φ) > 0.
TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE: Given a probabilistic logic program P and an object-ground
probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y], compute the tight answer substitution for
Q to P under a fixed notion of entailment s.
Observe that POSITIVE PROBABILITY is a generalization of the problem of deciding
whether a probabilistic logic program P is satisfiable, since P is satisfiable iff (P,)
belongs to POSITIVE PROBABILITY (since every probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies
Pr() = 1).
Notice also that, differently from classical definite logic programs, conjunctive
probabilistic logic programs may be unsatisfiable, because of logical inconsistencies
through integrity clauses or, more generally, because of probabilistic inconsistencies in
the assumed probability ranges. There are several ways to resolve such inconsistencies in a
probabilistic logic program P . One way is to remove single conditional constraints from P ,
for example, by applying the principle of specificity, through which more specific pieces
of probabilistic knowledge are preferred to less specific ones; see [57] for more details
on such an approach, which is based on probabilistic default reasoning. Another way to
resolve inconsistencies is to relax the probability bounds in every conditional constraint in
P by a minimum amount, as suggested by, for example, Jaumard et al. [33] and Batsell et
al. [4].
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3. Entailment semanticsIn this section, we describe the notions of entailment for probabilistic logic programs
that we focus on in this paper. We first define the classical notion of model-theoretic logical
entailment, also called 0-entailment. We then recall the classical notion of entailment
under maximum entropy, and we finally introduce a new notion of entailment under
maximum entropy, which adopts the closed world assumption (CWA) from classical logic
programming. They are called me-entailment and mc-entailment, respectively, and are both
stronger than 0-entailment (see Fig. 1).
3.1. Logical entailment
We now describe the classical notion of model-theoretic logical entailment, which we
also call 0-entailment. It is based on the idea of conditioning.
We define logical entailment (or 0-entailment) as follows. Given a ground probabilistic
logic program P and a ground conditional constraint (β|α)[l, u], we say that (β|α)[l, u]
is a 0-consequence of P , denoted P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u], iff every model of P is also a
model of (β|α)[l, u]. We say that (β|α)[l, u] is a tight 0-consequence of P , denoted
P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u], iff l (respectively, u) is the infimum (respectively, supremum) of
Pr(β|α) subject to all models Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0. Note that, canonically, l = 1 and
u= 0, when P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α (i.e., Pr(α) = 0 for all models Pr of P ).
Intuitively, we perform a conditioning of every model Pr of P on the premise α, since
P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] expresses that Prα(β) ∈ [l, u] for all models Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0.
Moreover, P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u] says that l (respectively, u) is the infimum (respectively,
supremum) of Prα(β) subject to all models Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0. This intuition is more
formally expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let P be a ground probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a
ground conditional constraint. Then, P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] iff Prα(β) ∈ [l, u] for all models
Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0. Moreover, P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u] iff l (respectively, u) is the infimum
(respectively, supremum) of Prα(β) subject to all models Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0.
Fig. 1. Entailment semantics for probabilistic logic programs and their “stronger than” relationships (“s1 → s2”
means that s1 is stronger than s2; see Section 5.4).
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3.2. Entailment under maximum entropyThe notion of logical entailment has often been criticized in the literature for its
inferential weakness (see also Examples 4.2 and 4.3). One way to strengthen logical
entailment is by using the principle of maximum entropy. This is an old idea that is already
discussed by Cheeseman [10] and Nilsson [65]. Entailment under maximum entropy is
based on selecting a single unique model (the one with maximum entropy) rather than
considering all models of a probabilistic logic program.
The maximum entropy model (or me-model) of a satisfiable probabilistic logic program
P , denoted me[P ], is the unique probabilistic interpretation Pr that is a model of P and that
has the greatest entropy among all the models of P , where the entropy of a probabilistic




Pr(I) · log Pr(I).
The rationale behind the maximum entropy principle is to represent given probabilistic
information as faithfully as possible, by maximizing admissible indeterminateness.
No external independence assumptions are necessary to make the me-method work—
independence is only assumed if there is no (information-theoretical) justification for
establishing dependence. Excellent and thorough logical investigations into me-reasoning
can be found in [67,69].
Using Lagrange optimization techniques, we obtain the following representation of the
me-model of P for all possible worlds I ∈ IΦ :









where α0 is a normalizing factor, and α+ψ |φ and α
−
ψ |φ are real numbers that are associated
with each element (ψ|φ)[l, u] of ground(P ) such that P is satisfied and the entropy is
maximized [88]. Thus, me[P ] is a so-called c-adaptation, following the structure imposed
by the conditional constraints in ground(P ) [39]. In particular, the following holds:
α+ψ |φ = 1 and α−ψ |φ = 0 for all (ψ|φ)[1,1] ∈ ground(P ),
α+ψ |φ = 0 and α−ψ |φ = 1 for all (ψ|φ)[0,0] ∈ ground(P ). (2)
We are now ready to define the notion of entailment under maximum entropy (or me-
entailment) as follows. Let P be a ground probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u]
be a ground conditional constraint. We say that (β|α)[l, u] is an me-consequence of P ,
denoted P‖∼me (β|α)[l, u], iff either (i) P is unsatisfiable, or (ii) me[P ] satisfies
(β|α)[l, u]. We say that (φ|ψ)[l, u] is a tight me-consequence of P , denoted P‖∼metight
(β|α)[l, u], iff either (i) P is unsatisfiable, l = 1, and u = 0, or (ii) me[P ](α) = 0, l = 1,
and u = 0, or (iii) me[P ](α) > 0 and me[P ](β|α)= l = u.
Applying the me-method to (possibly interval-valued) probabilistic constraints solves
the problem of inferring noninformative probabilistic intervals as answers to queries (see,
e.g., [10,65])—me-entailment always returns a precise probability value. In particular,
interval-valued probabilistic information is processed in interaction with other constraints,
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to find a most appropriate value within the given interval. But note that the me-approach,
in spite of appearing quite bold by computing a precise value, is actually a cautious (but
maximally informative) inference procedure in that it is optimally prepared for acquiring
future information (see [77]).
3.3. Entailment under maximum entropy and CWA
We next introduce a new notion of entailment under maximum entropy, which
applies to conjunctive probabilistic logic programs, and which adopts the closed world
assumption (CWA) from classical logic programming [2]. We will see that it has in
particular nicer computational properties than the notion of me-entailment.
The closed world assumption for a conjunctive probabilistic logic program P is defined
relative to a classical approximation of P as follows. The classical approximation of
a conjunctive probabilistic logic program P , denoted app(P ), is the set of all ψ ⇐ φ
such that (i) (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ) for some l > 0, and (ii) P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ. For ground
conjunctive events α, the closed world assumption for P w.r.t. α, denoted CWA(P,α), is
defined as follows:
CWA(P,α) = {⊥ ⇐ p | p ∈ HBΦ, app(P ) ∪ {α} 
|= p}.
We distinguish between active and inactive ground formulas w.r.t. P and α as follows.
A ground atom p ∈ HBΦ is inactive w.r.t. P and α iff ⊥ ⇐ p belongs to CWA(P,α).
A ground event γ (respectively, ground conditional constraint F ) is inactive w.r.t. P and α
iff at least one ground atom in γ (respectively, F ) is inactive w.r.t. P and α. A ground atom
(respectively, ground event, ground conditional constraint) is active w.r.t. P and α iff it is
not inactive w.r.t. P and α. In the sequel, we often omit P and α when they are clear from
the context.
The following theorem shows that conclusions of the form P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] are
invariant under the closed world assumption for P w.r.t. β ∧ α.
Theorem 3.2. Let P be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a
ground conjunctive conditional constraint. Then,
P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u].
Hence, all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ that are inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α are actually
irrelevant to conclusions of the form P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. That is, logical entailment from P
coincides with logical entailment from the “active equivalent” to P . This result is more
formally expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let P be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be
a ground conjunctive conditional constraint. Let P̂ denote the set of (i) all members of
ground(P ) that are active w.r.t. P and β ∧α, and (ii) all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (ii.a) φ is active
w.r.t. P and β ∧ α, and (ii.b) (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) for some r > 0 and some ψ that is
inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Then,
P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] iff P̂ ‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u].
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The notion of me-entailment, however, lacks the properties described in Theorems 3.2
and 3.3, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 3.4. Let the conjunctive probabilistic logic program P be given by:
P = {(c|b)[0.9,0.9], (b|a)[0.8,0.8], (c|a)[0.9,0.9]}.
It then holds P‖∼me (b|c)[0.65,0.65]. However, as CWA(P, b ∧ c)= {⊥ ⇐ a}, we obtain
P ∪ CWA(P, b ∧ c)‖∼me (b|c)[0.56,0.56] and also P̂ ‖∼me (b|c)[0.56,0.56], where P̂ =
{(c|b)[0.9,0.9]}. Note that these (rounded) numerical values under me- and mc-entailment
are computed with SPIRIT [78].
To combine the strength of me-entailment with the straightness of logical entailment, we
now define the notion of entailment under maximum entropy and CWA (or mc-entailment).
Intuitively, the ground atoms that are irrelevant to logical conclusions should actually also
be irrelevant to maximum entropy conclusions.
More formally, let P be a ground conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let
(β|α)[l, u] be a ground conjunctive conditional constraint. We say that (β|α)[l, u] is an mc-
consequence of P , denoted P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u], iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) ‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
We say that (β|α)[l, u] is a tight mc-consequence of P , denoted P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u], iff
P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u].
The following two results then follow from the definition of mc-entailment. They show
that Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 carry over to mc-entailment. The first one shows that also
conclusions of the form P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] are invariant under the closed world assumption
for P w.r.t. β ∧ α.
Theorem 3.5. Let P be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a
ground conjunctive conditional constraint. Then,
P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u].
The next theorem shows that all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ that are inactive w.r.t. P and
β∧α are also irrelevant to conclusions P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u]. It also shows that mc-entailment
can be defined as me-entailment from the “active equivalent” to P .
Theorem 3.6. Let P be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be
a ground conjunctive conditional constraint. Let P̂ denote the set of (i) all members of
ground(P ) that are active w.r.t. P and β ∧α, and (ii) all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (ii.a) φ is active
w.r.t. P and β ∧ α, and (ii.b) (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) for some r > 0 and some ψ that is
inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Then,
P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P̂ ‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P̂‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
Thus, by combining the maximum entropy approach with the closed world assumption,
we might lose some probabilistic information, but we gain a more stable, classical behavior
of the corresponding inference relation.
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The idea of relevance applied here is based on classical deduction properties and
depends on the query currently considered—each query defines its own context of
relevance. Thus, the query plays an active part in determining what is relevant. In this
respect, our approach significantly differs from the ideas of relevance developed, e.g., in
[5,14]. However, there are some similarities to those works. For instance, Benferhat et al.
[5] introduce the notion of π -consistence to base irrelevance on consistency considerations.
It ensures that all possible worlds implying the classical counterparts of the default rules
have maximal possibility degree (i.e., 1). This is dual to our application of the closed world
assumption, which claims that all atoms not implied by the classical counterparts of the
probabilistic rules (and the query) should have minimal probabilistic degree (i.e., 0).
4. Examples
In this section, we give some examples that show the relevance of probabilistic logic
programs in practice. In the sequel, predicate and constant symbols begin with lower
case letters, whereas object and bound variables start with upper case letters. The correct
answers and the tight answer substitutions under 0-entailment below are computed with
LINOP [79], which is built on top of the public-domain linear optimization software
lp_solve, while the correct answers and the tight answer substitutions under me- and
mc-entailment are computed with SPIRIT [78] and PIT [21,82]. Both systems compute
maximum entropy values approximately, by making use of network-based, graphical
structures to cut down the complexity of probabilistic knowledge propagation. In some
cases, maximum entropy probabilities can be calculated via exact symbolic expressions
(cf. [38]).
Our first example concerns the problem of route planning.
Example 4.1 (Route planning). Assume that John wants to pick up Mary after she stopped
working. To do so, he must drive from his home to her office. But, he left quite late. So, he
is wondering if he can still reach her in time. Unfortunately, since it is rush hour, it may be
the case that he runs into a traffic jam. Now, John has the following knowledge at hand:
Given a road (ro) from R to S, the probability that he can reach (re) S from R without
running into a traffic jam is greater than 0.7. Given a road in the south (so) of the town,
this probability is even greater than 0.9. A friend just called him and gave him advice
(ad) about some roads without any significant traffic. Clearly, if he can reach S from T
and T from R, both without running into a traffic jam, then he can also reach S from R
without running into a traffic jam. Furthermore, John has some concrete knowledge about
the roads, the roads in the south of the town, and the roads that his friend was talking about.
For example, he knows that there is a road from his home (h) to the university (u), from
the university to the airport (a), and from the airport to Mary’s office (o). Moreover, John
believes that his friend was talking about the road from the university to the airport with a
probability between 0.8 and 0.9 (he is not completely sure about it anymore, though).
The above and some other probabilistic knowledge is expressed by the following
conjunctive probabilistic logic program P :
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Table 1
Correct answers and tight answer substitutions for Example 4.1
Probabilistic query 0-entailment me-entailment mc-entailment
Q1 No No No
Q2 {X/0.70, Y/1.00} {X/0.86, Y/0.86} {X/0.94, Y/0.94}
Q3 {X/0.88, Y/1.00} {X/0.94, Y/0.94} {X/0.96, Y/0.96}
P = {(ro(h,u) | )[1,1],(
ro(u, a) | )[1,1],(
ro(a, o) | )[1,1],(
ad(h,u) | )[1,1],(
ad(u, a) | )[0.8,0.9],(
so(a, o) | )[1,1],(
re(R,S) | ro(R,S))[0.7,1],(
re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ so(R,S))[0.9,1],(
re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ ad(R,S))[1,1],(
re(R,S) | re(R,T )∧ re(T ,S))[1,1]}.
John is wondering whether he can reach Mary’s office from his home, such that the
probability of him running into a traffic jam is smaller than 0.01. Moreover, he is wondering
about the probability of reaching the office, without running into a traffic jam. Finally, he is
wondering about this probability, given that his friend was talking about the road from the




re(h, o) | )[0.99,1],
Q2 = ∃
(
re(h, o) | )[X,Y ],
Q3 = ∃
(
re(h, o) | ad(u, a))[X,Y ].
The correct answer for Q1 to P and the tight answer substitutions for Q2 and Q3 to P
under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment are shown in Table 1.
The following two examples are taken from the area of medical diagnosis.
Example 4.2 (Diagnosis 1: appendicitis). In a hospital, physicians have to diagnose
whether patients with acute abdominal pain are suffering from appendicitis or not.
Diagnosing appendicitis is a difficult task, since a lot of different symptoms (as, e.g., high
temperature, a high rate of leucocytes, vomiting, and various types of pains) can indicate
appendicitis, but often only the joint occurrence of several of these symptoms reliably
supports the diagnosis (see, e.g., [66,80]).
Here, we only consider four possible symptoms of appendicitis (app), namely a high
rate of leucocytes (leuco_high) and the following three different types of pain: rectal pain
154 G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202
Table 2
Tight answer substitutions for Example 4.2
Probabilistic query 0-entailment me-entailment mc-entailment
Q1 {X/0, Y/1} {X/0.7375, Y/0.7375} {X/0.7250, Y/0.7250}
Q2 {X/0, Y/1} {X/0.7837, Y/0.7837} {X/0.7837, Y/0.7837}
(rec_pain), pain when released (pain_rel), and rebound tenderness (reb_tender). Thus, for
the sake of intelligibility, our view on this area is a very simplified one.2 Let our knowledge
about the relationships between app, leuco_high and the three types of pain be expressed
by the following conjunctive probabilistic logic program P (see also [84]):
P = {(reb_tender(P ) | pain_rel(P ))[0.70,0.75],(
reb_tender(P ) | leuco_high(P ))[0.70,0.75],(
app(P ) | rec_pain(P )∧ pain_rel(P ))[0.70,0.75],(
app(P ) | rec_pain(P )∧ reb_tender(P ))[0.65,0.70],(
app(P ) | pain_rel(P )∧ reb_tender(P )∧ leuco_high(P ))[0.80,0.85]}.
Suppose now that Judy is a patient showing the symptoms leuco_high and pain_rel.
Which is the probability that Judy has appendicitis? Which is the probability that she has
appendicitis given that she also feels rectal pain? These questions can be expressed by the
following two probabilistic queries:
Q1 = ∃
(
app(judy) | leuco_high(judy)∧ pain_rel(judy))[X,Y ],
Q2 = ∃
(
app(judy) | leuco_high(judy)∧ pain_rel(judy)∧ rec_pain(judy))[X,Y ].
The tight answer substitutions for Q1 and Q2 to P under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment
are shown in Table 2. Here, we observe a slight difference between the tight answer
substitutions under me- and mc-entailment to Q1, whereas the tight answer substitutions
under me- and mc-entailment to Q2 are the same.
Example 4.3 (Diagnosis 2: cold). We now model the dependencies between the
disease cold (cold) and its symptoms headache (headache), cough (cough), sore throat
(sore_throat), and fever (fever). Consider the following conjunctive probabilistic logic
program P :
P = {(cold(X) | headache(X))[0.60,0.70],(
cold(X) | cough(X)∧ sore_throat(X))[0.90,0.95],(fever(X) | cold(X))[0.60,0.80]}.
2 The system LEXMED [21] shows that maximum entropy inference is able to take into account many more
symptoms for appendicitis. By accepting arbitrary combinations of them for queries, LEXMED aims at capturing
adequately the complex interrelationships between symptoms and diseases to propose a reliable diagnosis.
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Table 3
Tight answer substitutions for Example 4.3
Probabilistic query 0-entailment me-entailment mc-entailment
Q1 {X/0, Y/1} {X/0.6854, Y/0.6854} {X/0.6000, Y/0.6000}
Q2 {X/0, Y/1} {X/0.6854, Y/0.6854} {X/0.6000, Y/0.6000}
Q3 {X/0, Y/1} {X/0.9201, Y/0.9201} {X/0.9201, Y/0.9201}
Suppose that Peter (peter), Paul (paul), and Mary (mary) are patients, each of them
suspecting to have caught a cold. Peter complains about headache and a sore throat,
Paul is coughing and has headache, too, and Mary shows all four symptoms. What is the
probability of each of them actually suffering from a cold? This can be expressed by the
following three conjunctive probabilistic queries:
Q1 = ∃
(
cold(peter) | headache(peter)∧ sore_throat(peter))[X,Y ],
Q2 = ∃
(
cold(paul) | cough(paul)∧ headache(paul))[X,Y ],
Q3 = ∃
(
cold(mary) | cough(mary)∧ headache(mary)
∧ sore_throat(mary)∧ fever(mary))[X,Y ].
The tight answer substitutions for these queries to P under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment are
shown in Table 3. Here, we see a clear difference between tight me- and tight mc-entailment
in the answers to the first two queries. Of course, for the third query, we obtain the same
tight probability intervals under me- and mc-entailment, showing a clear accumulation of
effects.
5. Nonmonotonic properties
Nonmonotonic logics are appreciated for their closeness to commonsense reasoning,
but also known as problematic as to concerns complexity and formal logical aspects. In a
probabilistic environment, all the more weight must be attached to these problems, due to
the richness of syntax and the abundance of models.
Within the last decade, standards have been established to judge the quality of
nonmonotonic logics, and benchmark examples pointing out specific problems have been
discussed vividly. That work has been done mostly in qualitative and symbolic settings.
In this section, we elaborate the nonmonotonic behavior of me- and mc-entailment with
respect to probabilistic versions of the above mentioned standards, to show their well-
behavedness. In addition, we compare them to classical formalisms, and highlight special
features by illustrative examples.
We start with delineating the nonmonotonic aspects of probabilistic reasoning under 0-,
me-, and mc-entailment that we explore in this section.
5.1. Nonmonotonicity of probabilistic reasoning
Certain conditional constraints (ψ|φ)[1,1] and (ψ|φ)[0,0] can be understood classi-
cally as “φ implies ψ” and “φ implies ¬ψ”, respectively. The notions of 0-, me-, and
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mc-entailment are all compatible with the monotonic notion of model-theoretic logical en-
tailment in classical propositional logics for such constraints, and satisfy the following
property of inheritance of classical knowledge:
C-INH If F‖∼ (ψ|φ)[c, c] and φ ⇐ φ
 is logically valid, then F‖∼ (ψ|φ
)[c, c],
for all ground events ψ , φ, and φ
, all sets of ground conditional constraints F , and all
c ∈ {0,1}. That is, classical knowledge is inherited along subclass relationships.
Purely probabilistic conditional constraints (ψ|φ)[l, u], however, should be interpreted
as “the conditional probability of ψ given φ lies between l and u”. Due to this inherent
uncertainty, the notions of 0-, me-, and mc-entailment generally do not satisfy the following
property of inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge:
P-INH If F‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u] and φ ⇐ φ
 is logically valid, then F‖∼ (ψ|φ
)[l, u],
for all ground events ψ , φ, and φ
, all sets of ground conditional constraints F , and
all l, u ∈ [0,1] with l < 1 and u > 0. Even worse, strengthening the antecedent of a
purely probabilistic conditional constraint may lead to totally different probability values.
This is exactly what makes probabilistic reasoning under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment an
excellent candidate for default reasoning with exceptions. Therefore, no complete subclass
inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge, as expressed by P-INH, can be expected to
hold under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment.
The inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge, however, can nevertheless be a
desirable feature of probabilistic entailment, which is well-known from, e.g., reference
class reasoning [44,45,71,74]. In fact, while logical entailment does not have any subclass
inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge, we will show that both notions of entailment
under maximum entropy realize some limited form of inheritance of purely probabilistic
knowledge along subclass relationships. This suggests that an appropriate form of subclass
inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge may be obtained by focusing on some
preferred models, or on one “best” model, as is done by me- and mc-entailment. We
will first illustrate the nonmonotonic behavior of me- and mc-entailment by studying
benchmark examples, and then describe some of their general properties of nonmonotonic
inference.
5.2. Benchmark examples
We start with analyzing in more detail the nonmonotonic behavior of me- and mc-
entailment with respect to the missing property P-INH. Our first example deals with
Tweety, the nonflying penguin, which is worth-while studying for many reasons. It is not
only the most famous example for illustrating nonmonotonic behavior in general, but it
also provides a well-understood setting to investigate subclass inheritance, the aspect of
irrelevance, and how exceptionality is dealt with.
G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202 157
Table 4
Tight answer substitutions for Example 5.1
Probabilistic query 0-entailment me-entailment mc-entailment
Q1 {X/0.00, Y/1.00} {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98, Y/0.98}
Q2 {X/0.98, Y/1.00} {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98, Y/0.98}
Q3 {X/0.00, Y/1.00} {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90, Y/0.90}
Q4 {X/0.90, Y/0.98} {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90, Y/0.90}
Q5 {X/0.00, Y/0.05} {X/0.05, Y/0.05} {X/0.05, Y/0.05}
Example 5.1 (Tweety). The following probabilistic logic program P describes the penguin
Tweety with regard to one property that he does not share with other birds (fly), and one
property that is common to both birds and penguins (have_legs):
P = {(fly(T ) | bird(T ))[0.9,0.98],(
bird(T ) | penguin(T ))[1,1],(fly(T ) | penguin(T ))[0,0.05],(
have_legs(T ) | bird(T ))[0.98,1]}.
So, Tweety (tweety) is an exceptional bird with respect to the property of being able to
fly (fly). But is Tweety also exceptional with respect to having legs (have_legs)? Certainly
not—it would be unintuitive to believe that Tweety does not have legs for the only reason
that Tweety is a nonflying bird. Moreover, what about the ability to fly of the bird Robin
(robin), who is red (red) and thus belongs to a proper subclass of birds? The atom red is not
mentioned at all in the probabilistic rules above. Thus, it should be considered irrelevant to
the conditional event fly(T )|bird(T ).
Consider the following probabilistic queries:
Q1 = ∃
(
have_legs(tweety) | penguin(tweety))[X,Y ],
Q2 = ∃
(
have_legs(robin) | bird(robin))[X,Y ],
Q3 = ∃
(fly(robin) | bird(robin)∧ red(robin))[X,Y ],
Q4 = ∃
(fly(robin) | bird(robin))[X,Y ],
Q5 = ∃
(fly(tweety) | penguin(tweety))[X,Y ].
The tight answer substitutions for these queries are given in Table 4. Under me- and
mc-entailment, Tweety’s inability to fly has indeed no effect on the probability of him
having legs—Tweety is an exceptional bird with respect to flying, but not with respect to
being equipped with legs. Moreover, processing the third query Q3 reveals that, in fact,
the property of being red does not influence Robin’s ability to fly. So, obviously irrelevant
attributes are simply ignored by me-inference. The notion of 0-entailment, however, does
not yield these desired results.
Probability theory provides an excellent framework to handle nonmonotonicity: Birds
mostly fly, Pr(fly(T ) | bird(T )) ≈ 1, but Tweety, who is a bird and a penguin, does not fly
within a probabilistic environment: Pr(fly(tweety) | bird(tweety) ∧ penguin(tweety)) = 0,
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if only Pr(fly(T ) | penguin(T )) = 0. The notion of logical entailment, which is based
on considering all probabilistic models, however, is too weak in general—for instance,
it allows of no systematic subclass inheritance, regarding anything as relevant in principle.
In contrast to this, the notions of me- and mc-entailment, both based on considering
exactly one distinguished distribution, cope in an elegant way with obviously irrelevant
information, as the following general consideration shows: If α is a ground instance of an
atom not mentioned in a probabilistic logic program P but occurring in the body of a query
Q = ∃(ψ|φ ∧ α)[x, y], then
me[P ](ψ|φ ∧ α) = me[P ](ψ|φ).
No external and explicit assumption of conditional independence is necessary here. Rather,
the principle of maximum entropy treats information as irrelevant as long as there is
no reason to suppose the contrary. This permits a systematic subclass inheritance, as in
Example 5.1: birds mostly fly, and red birds do so, too.
Moreover, Example 5.1 illustrates that me-inference handles exceptionality with respect
to one attribute in an adequate way, without blocking other reasonable conclusions. We
showed that, given P = PTweety, the probability of Tweety to have legs is the same as that
of any other bird, although Tweety is an exceptional bird. This is not a mere numerical
coincidence—using formula (1), it is easy to verify that
me[PTweety]
(
have_legs(T ) | penguin(T ))= me[PTweety](have_legs(T ) | bird(T ))
whatever probability is assigned to have_legs(T ) | bird(T ).
This well-behavedness is due to an indifference property that the me-model shows
for worlds that behave in the same positive, negative, or neutral way w.r.t. the involved
conditional events (see Lemma 7.7), which in turn is only a superficial manifestation of
a deeper conditional indifference: The me-principle represents conditional constraints by
balancing conditional effects; for more details, see [39,41].
In the following example, we illustrate how obviously irrelevant information is dealt
with under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment.
Example 5.2. Consider the following conjunctive probabilistic logic program P :
P = {(bird(T ) | penguin(T ))[1,1],(fly(T ) | bird(T ))[0.9,0.95],(fly(T ) | penguin(T ))[0,0.05],(
easy_to_see(T ) | yellow(T ))[0.95,1]}.
We are now interested in the probabilities with which Brian, the brightly yellow penguin,
is able to fly, and is easy to be seen, respectively:
Q1 = ∃
(fly(brian) | penguin(brian)∧ yellow(brian))[X,Y ],
Q2 = ∃
(
easy_to_see(brian) | penguin(brian)∧ yellow(brian))[X,Y ].
As expected, the tight answer substitutions for Q1 and Q2 under both me- and mc-
entailment are given by {X/0.05, Y/0.05} and {X/0.95, Y/0.95}, respectively. So, the
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maximum entropy methodologies faithfully observe explicit information, while not allow-
ing obviously irrelevant information to have any influence. The tight answer substitutions
for Q1 and Q2 under 0-entailment, however, are both given by {X/0.00, Y/1.00}, falling
back to complete ignorance in both cases.
The (extended) Nixon Diamond in the next example deals with conflicting evidence and
the relevance of information in a more general sense.
Example 5.3 ((Extended) Nixon Diamond). We consider a probabilistic generalization
of the well-known Nixon Diamond “generally, quakers are pacifists” and “generally,
republicans are not pacifists” extended by the default rules “generally, quakers are
Americans”, “generally, Americans like baseball”, and “generally, quakers do not like
baseball”. More precisely, let the following probabilistic logic program P describe the
original Nixon Diamond:
P = {(pacifist(T ) | quaker(T ))[0.8,0.95],(
pacifist(T ) | republican(T ))[0.05,0.2]}.
Let the probabilistic logic program P ′ describe the extended Nixon Diamond:
P ′ = P ∪ {(american(T ) | quaker(T ))[0.9,0.99],(
like_baseball(T ) | american(T ))[0.85,0.95],(
like_baseball(T ) | quaker(T ))[0.05,0.3]}.
Given P and P ′, what is the probability of Dick, who is known to be a quaker and a
republican, to be a pacifist? We get the following probabilistic query Q:
Q = ∃(pacifist(dick) | quaker(dick)∧ republican(dick))[X,Y ].
The tight answer substitutions for Q to P and P ′ under 0-entailment are both given by
{X/0.00, Y/1.00}, while the tight answer substitutions under both me- and mc-entailment
are given by {X/0.5, Y/0.5} and {X/0.61, Y/0.61}, respectively.
That is, in this case, the tight answer substitutions under 0-entailment give intuitively
correct, but extremely uninformative results, reflecting complete ignorance. The tight
answer substitutions under me- and mc-entailment show that, similar to treating this
problem via the rational closure approach [48] or by System Z [25] (cf. [15, p. 26]),
the (numerical) answer to the query depends on which of the two programs P and P ′
is used. While the original Nixon diamond does not allow us to draw any conclusion
about whether Dick is a pacifist or not, the extended Nixon diamond is now biased
in favor of Dick being a pacifist under the maximum entropy approach. This appears
a bit strange, as the new information about Americans, quakers, and baseball seems
prima facie irrelevant to the relationships between quakers, pacifists, and republicans. The
observed shift in probability, however, may be explained by recalling that in a maximum
entropy environment, probabilities reflect informativeness. The additional constraints in
P ′ add information about quakers, thereby increasing the informativeness of quaker.
Thus, when evaluating the query Q, quaker(dick) triggers a greater flow of information
than republican(dick). This results in the observed bias. In this way, adding constraints
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may change the point of view. This, however, does not imply that being American or
liking baseball is definitely relevant for Dick’s loving peace: Adding american(dick) ∧
like_baseball(dick) to the antecedent of the conditional event above will not alter the
maximum entropy probability:
me[P ′](pacifist(dick) | quaker(dick)∧ republican(dick)
∧ american(dick)∧ like_baseball(dick))= 0.61.
Once again, we illustrate how the maximum entropy approaches combine conflicting
information in another penguin-example.
Example 5.4. The following probabilistic logic program P expresses knowledge about the
flying capabilities of penguins, birds, and objects with metal wings:
P = {(bird(T ) | penguin(T ))[1,1],(fly(T ) | metal_wings(T ))[0.95,1],(fly(T ) | bird(T ))[0.95,1],(fly(T ) | penguin(T ))[0,0.05]}.
What is the probability to fly of Supertweety, a penguin with metal wings,
Q = ∃(fly(supertweety) | penguin(supertweety)
∧ metal_wings(supertweety))[X,Y ]?
As tight answer substitutions for this query under both me- and mc-entailment, we obtain
{X/0.2127, Y/0.2127}. Although the metal wings that Supertweety has attached to his
sides increase our confidence in him being able to fly, they are not convincing enough to
make us believe that he can really fly. Note that the tight answer substitution under logical
entailment is given by {X/0, Y/1}.
The last example, which is taken from [3], shows how nonconflicting information is
combined by the maximum entropy approaches.
Example 5.5. Let the probabilistic logic program P be given as follows:
P = {(bird(T ) | magpie(T ))[1,1],(
chirp(T ) | bird(T ))[0.7,0.8],(
chirp(T ) | magpie(T ))[0,0.99]}.
Consider the following probabilistic query Q:
Q = (chirp(polly) | magpie(polly))[X,Y ].
Knowing that magpies are birds, the probability to chirp of the magpie Polly is already
expected to be in [0,0.99]. So, the last conditional constraint of P turns out to be vacuous,
and by maximizing indeterminateness, the tight answer substitutions under me- and mc-
entailment are both given by {X/0.7, Y/0.7}, while the tight answer substitution under
logical entailment is given by {X/0, Y/0.99}.
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5.3. General propertiesAs the examples from the preceding section show, the notions of me- and mc-entailment
raise the inferential power of probabilistic reasoning substantially. Instead of considering
all possible models, the maximum entropy method bases its inferences on one particularly
distinguished model—that with maximum entropy. However, one may wonder if this
view is not too narrow. One way to explain the reasonableness of maximum entropy
inference is to investigate its formal properties according to widely accepted standards for
nonmonotonic inference relations, such as System P [43] and related postulates. A special
focus will be on irrelevance properties; here we propose a new postulate called strong
irrelevance aiming at preventing interactions of conditional constraints.
In the following, we assume that φ, ψ , ε, ε′, α, β are ground events, and that P is
a (fixed) ground probabilistic logic program. In case of mc-entailment, we additionally
assume that φ, ψ , ε, ε′, α, β , and P are all conjunctive. Let l, l′, u,u′, r, s ∈ [0,1].
Moreover, for the sake of representational clarity, we presuppose that P satisfies the
following explicitness condition, which ensures that every classical relationship that is
logically entailed by P is already explicitly stated in P .
Explicitness condition. For every I ∈ IΦ , if Pr(I) = 0 for all models Pr of P , then there
exists some (ψ|φ)[c, c] ∈ P such that either
c = 1 and I |= φ ∧¬ψ or c = 0 and I |= φ ∧ψ. (3)
We implicitly assume that all notions of entailment are naturally extended to negations
of conditional constraints of the form ¬(β|α)[r, s], which are true in a probabilistic
interpretation Pr iff Pr(α) > 0 and Pr(β|α) /∈ [r, s].
We first consider the postulates Right Weakening (RW), Reflexivity (Ref ), Left Logical
Equivalence (LLE), Cut, Cautious Monotonicity (CM), and Or proposed by Kraus et al.
[43], which are commonly regarded as being particularly desirable for any reasonable
notion of nonmonotonic entailment ‖∼, and which are usually referred to as System P .
We consider the following generalization for a probabilistic setting:
RW. If (φ|)[l, u] ⇒ (ψ|)[l′, u′] is logically valid and P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u],
then P‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l′, u′].
Ref. P‖∼ (ε|ε)[1,1].
LLE. If ε⇔ε′ is logically valid, then P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u] iff P‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u].
Cut. If P‖∼ (ε′|ε)[1,1] and P‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u], then P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u].
CM. If P‖∼ (ε′|ε)[1,1] and P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u], then P‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Or. If P‖∼ (φ|ε)[1,1] and P‖∼ (φ|ε′)[1,1], then P‖∼ (φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1].
The following theorem shows that most of these postulates are indeed satisfied by all
described notions of entailment for conditional constraints (note that Or does not apply to
mc-entailment).
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Theorem 5.6. ‖∼0 and ‖∼me satisfy RW, Ref, LLE, Cut, CM, and Or for all probabilistic
logic programs P , all ground events ε, ε′, φ, ψ , and all l, l′, u,u′ ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, ‖∼mc
satisfies Ref, LLE, Cut, and CM for all conjunctive probabilistic logic programs P , all
ground conjunctive events ε, ε′, φ, ψ , and all l, l′, u,u′ ∈ [0,1].
It is unclear whether ‖∼mc satisfies RW or not. The point is that taking new conditional
constraints into account may change the resulting maximum entropy distribution so
that logical dependencies may get lost. Nevertheless, there are information-theoretical,
informal arguments that suggest that RW holds for ‖∼mc. However, neither a formal proof
nor a counterexample for RW have been found so far.
Another desirable property is Rational Monotonicity (RM) [43]:
RM. If P‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l, u] and P‖ ¬(ε′|ε)[1,1], then P‖∼ (ψ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Informally, RM describes a restricted form of monotony, and thus allows to ignore
certain kinds of irrelevant knowledge. The following theorem shows that both me- and
mc-entailment also satisfy RM.
Theorem 5.7. ‖∼me (respectively, ‖∼mc) satisfies RM for all probabilistic (respectively,
conjunctive probabilistic) logic programs P , all ground (respectively, ground conjunctive)
events ε, ε′, and ψ , and all l, u ∈ [0,1].
We next consider the property Irrelevance (Irr), which is adapted from [6]:
Irr. If P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u], and no atom of ground(P ) and φ|ε occurs in ε′,
then P‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Informally, Irr says that ε′ is irrelevant to a conclusion “P‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l, u]” when they
are defined over disjoint sets of atoms. The following result shows that both me- and mc-
entailment satisfy Irr.
Theorem 5.8. ‖∼me (respectively, ‖∼mc) satisfies Irr for all probabilistic (respectively,
conjunctive probabilistic) logic programs P , all ground (respectively, ground conjunctive)
events ε, ε′, and φ, and all l, u ∈ [0,1].
The property Irr formalizes a very basic form of irrelevance to be expected from
inference relations. We now propose a stronger irrelevance property, called strong
irrelevance (SI):
SI. If P‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u] and no atom of ground(P ) and ψ|φ occurs in β|α,
then P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u] and P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼ (ψ|φ ∧ α)[l, u].
Strong irrelevance says that adding conditional constraints on newly occurring atoms,
on the one hand, does not change previously made inferences, and, on the other hand, does
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not cause interferences with the other conditional constraints. The following theorem states
that both me- and mc-entailment satisfy the property SI.
Theorem 5.9. ‖∼me (respectively, ‖∼mc) satisfies SI for all probabilistic (respectively,
conjunctive probabilistic) logic programs P , all ground (respectively, ground conjunctive)
events α, β , φ, and ψ , and all l, u, r, s ∈ [0,1].
We next consider the property Direct Inference (DI), adapted from [3]:
DI. If (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ) and ε ⇔ φ is logically valid, then P‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l, u].
Informally, DI expresses that P should entail all its own conditional constraints. Note
that the property DI is similar to LLE. In fact, DI is implied by LLE together with another
nonmonotonic property called Inclusion (Inc):
Inc. If (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ), then P‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u].
Lemma 5.10. If ‖∼ satisfies LLE and Inc, then it also satisfies DI.
The next result shows that all discussed notions of entailment satisfy Inc and DI.
Theorem 5.11. ‖∼0 and ‖∼me satisfy Inc and DI for all probabilistic logic programs P , all
ground events ε, φ, and ψ , and all l, u ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, ‖∼mc satisfies Inc and DI for
all conjunctive probabilistic logic programs P , all ground conjunctive events ε, φ, and ψ ,
and all l, u ∈ [0,1].
5.4. Relationship between probabilistic formalisms
We next analyze the relationship between the discussed notions of entailment.
For entailment semantics s1 and s2, we say that s1 is stronger than s2 iff ‖∼s1 is a
superset of ‖∼s2 . That is, F‖∼s2 F implies F‖∼s1 F , for all sets of ground conditional
constraintsF and all ground conditional constraints F for which both s1 and s2 are defined.
Equivalently, F‖∼s2tight (ψ|φ)[l2, u2] and F‖∼s1tight (ψ|φ)[l1, u1] implies [l2, u2] ⊇ [l1, u1],
for all sets of ground conditional constraints F and all ground conditional constraints
(ψ|φ)[l2, u2] and (ψ|φ)[l1, u1] for which both s1 and s2 are defined. Note that this
“stronger than” relation is reflexive and transitive.
The following theorem shows that the arrows in Fig. 1 actually represent “stronger than”
relationships between the entailment semantics shown in Fig. 1. In fact, from Example 3.4,
or 4.2, or 4.3 it can be seen that Fig. 1 draws a complete picture of the “stronger than”
relationships between the shown entailment semantics.
Theorem 5.12. Both me- and mc-entailment are stronger than logical entailment.
The next result shows that entailment under maximum entropy and logical entailment
coincide on the concluded ground classical conditional constraints.
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Theorem 5.13. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let (ψ|φ)[c, c] with c ∈ {0,1}
be a ground classical conditional constraint. Let P and (ψ|φ)[c, c] be conjunctive for
s = mc. Then, for every semantics s ∈ {me,mc}:
(a) P‖∼s (ψ|φ)[c, c] iff P‖∼0 (ψ|φ)[c, c].
(b) P‖∼stight (ψ|φ)[c, c] iff P‖∼0tight (ψ|φ)[c, c].
5.5. Relationship to classical formalisms
We now analyze the relationship to classical formalisms.
For classical conditional constraints F of the form (β|α)[0,0] (respectively, (β|α)[1,1]),
we use γ (F ) to denote the events ⊥ ⇐ β∧α (respectively, β ⇐ α). For probabilistic logic
programs P , we define γ (P ) as the set of all events γ (F ) with F ∈ P .
The following theorem shows that all three described notions of probabilistic entailment
generalize logical entailment with events.
Theorem 5.14. Let s ∈ {0,me,mc}. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let
F = (ψ|φ)[c, c] with c ∈ {0,1} be a ground classical conditional constraint. Let P and
F be conjunctive for s = mc. Then,
(a) P‖∼s F iff γ (P ) |= γ (F ).
(b) P‖∼stight F iff γ (P ) |= γ (F ) and γ (P ) 
|= ¬φ.
6. Naive characterizations
In this section, we characterize the solutions of the problems POSITIVE PROBABILITY
and TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {0,me,mc}, by straightforward decision and
optimization problems involving a system of linear constraints. We first describe how
the models of a probabilistic logic program correspond to the solutions of a system of
linear constraints. We then describe how POSITIVE PROBABILITY can be reduced to
the solvability of a system of linear constraints, and how TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE can
be reduced to POSITIVE PROBABILITY and two linear optimization problems. We next
show how TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE can be reduced to POSITIVE PROBABILITY and
an entropy maximization problem. In their restriction to the propositional framework, all
the above results are either straightforward or well known from the literature (see [55]
for a detailed overview). As a new result of this paper, we finally describe how TIGHT
mc-CONSEQUENCE can be reduced to POSITIVE PROBABILITY, computing the least
Herbrand model of a classical definite logic program, and TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE.
6.1. Preliminaries
The following theorem shows that the models of a probabilistic logic program P
correspond to the solutions of the system of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R) shown in Fig. 2,
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(u− 1)yr  0 (for all (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈F , u < 1)
yr  0 (for all r ∈R)
Fig. 2. System of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R) for Theorems 6.1 and 6.3–6.5.
where the parameters δ, F , and R denote a conditioning event, a finite set of ground
conditional constraints, and an index set for the variables.
Theorem 6.1. Let P be a probabilistic logic program. Let the parameters δ, F , and R be
given by δ = , F = ground(P ), and R = IΦ , respectively. Then:
(a) For every model Pr of P , there exists a solution (yr)r∈R of the system of linear
constraints LC(δ,F ,R) such that Pr(r)= yr for all r ∈ R.
(b) For every solution (yr)r∈R of the system of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R), there exists
a model Pr of P such that yr = Pr(r) for all r ∈R.
The crux with this naive system of linear constraints is that the number of variables is
given by the number of possible worlds over Φ and that the number of linear constraints is
linear in the number of ground instances of conditional constraints in P . Hence, especially
the number of variables is generally quite large, as the following example immediately
shows.
Example 6.2. Consider the probabilistic logic program P of Example 4.1. The naive
system of linear constraints of Theorem 6.1 has the quite large number of 264 ≈ 18 × 1018
(!) variables and 120 linear constraints.
6.2. Positive probability
The next theorem shows that the decision problem POSITIVE PROBABILITY can be
reduced to the problem of deciding if the system of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R) in Fig. 2
is solvable. This result follows from Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.3. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground event. Then,
P has a model Pr such that Pr(α) > 0 iff the system of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R) is
solvable, where δ = α, F = ground(P ), and R = IΦ .
6.3. Tight logical consequence
Consider now an object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] to a probabilistic
logic program P . To compute the tight answer substitution σ for Q to P under logical
entailment, we first decide whether P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α, which is the complement of an instance
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of POSITIVE PROBABILITY. If P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α, then σ is immediately given by {x/1, y/0}.
Otherwise, we additionally solve two optimization problems in which a linear fractional
objective function must be minimized and maximized subject to the system of linear
constraints in Fig. 2 as follows.
Theorem 6.4. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] be an
object-ground probabilistic query with P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. Then, the tight answer substitution
for Q to P under logical entailment is given by σ = {x/l, y/u}, where l (respectively, u) is
the optimal value of the following linear fractional program over the variables yr (r ∈ R),









subject to LC(δ,F ,R) and
∑
r∈R,r |=α
yr > 0. (4)
By a standard technique going back to Charnes and Cooper [9], the linear fractional
programs (4) can be transformed into two equivalent linear programs as follows.
Theorem 6.5. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] be an
object-ground probabilistic query with P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. Then, the tight answer substitution
for Q to P under logical entailment is given by σ = {x/l, y/u}, where l (respectively, u)
is the optimal value of the following linear program over the variables yr (r ∈ R), where




yr subject to LC(δ,F ,R). (5)
6.4. Tight consequence under maximum entropy
Consider again an object-ground probabilistic query Q= ∃(β|α)[x, y] to a probabilistic
logic program P . To compute the tight answer substitution σ for Q to P under
me-entailment, we first decide whether P‖∼me ⊥ ⇐ α. By the following well-known
proposition, we can equivalently decide whether P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α, which is the complement
of an instance of POSITIVE PROBABILITY.
Proposition 6.6. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground event. Then,
P‖∼me ⊥ ⇐ α iff P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α.
If indeed P‖∼me ⊥ ⇐ α, then σ is immediately given by {x/1, y/0}. Otherwise, σ is
given by {x/d, y/d}, where d = me[P ](β|α)= me[P ](β ∧α)/me[P ](α). Thus, it remains
to compute the values of β ∧ α and α under the me-model of P .
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More generally, the me-model of P can be computed in a straightforward way by
solving the following entropy maximization problem over the variables yr (r ∈ R), where




yr logyr subject to LC(δ,F ,R). (6)
6.5. Tight consequence under maximum entropy and CWA
To compute the tight answer substitution σ under mc-entailment for an object-ground
probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] to a probabilistic logic program P , we first compute
the logical approximation of P , which can be done by solving some instances of POSITIVE
PROBABILITY. Using classical definite logical programming techniques, we then compute
the set of all active ground atoms w.r.t. P and β ∧ α, which is the least Herbrand model
of the logical approximation of P . We next compute the set P̂ of (i) all active members
of ground(P ) w.r.t. P and β ∧ α, and (ii) all active ⊥ ⇐ φ w.r.t. P and β ∧ α such
that (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) for some r > 0 and some inactive ψ w.r.t. P and β ∧ α.
By Theorem 3.6, σ is then given by the tight answer substitution for Q to P̂ under me-
entailment.
6.6. A note on the computational complexity
The problems POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE are (presum-
ably) intractable. In detail, by the complexity results in [55], it is easy to see that the
decision problem POSITIVE PROBABILITY is NP-complete for ground probabilistic logic
programs P in the general case, where P contains arbitrary ground conditional constraints
and φ is arbitrary, and in the 1-conjunctive case, where P contains only 1-conjunctive
ground conditional constraints and φ is conjunctive. Furthermore, as shown in [55], the
optimization problem TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE is FPNP-complete for ground probabilis-
tic logic programs P in the general as well as the 1-conjunctive case. We refer to [55] for
more details on these results.
The optimization problems TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT mc-CONSEQUENCE
fall outside the range of such standard complexity analysis (where the upper complex-
ity bound is based on the existence of a polynomial-size probabilistic interpretation that
involves only rational numbers), since the me-model of a probabilistic logic program P
may involve irrational numbers. Nevertheless, as for the lower complexity bound, we can
say that TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT mc-CONSEQUENCE are (presumably) in-
tractable, as they both generalize POSITIVE PROBABILITY. As for the upper complexity
bound, observe that the me-model of P can be computed by iterative techniques, which
provably converge, and which are successfully used in existing maximum entropy systems,
such as SPIRIT [78] and PIT [21,82] (see also Section 7.6).
In summary, any attempt towards efficiently solving POSITIVE PROBABILITY and
TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {0,me,mc}, should be guided by looking for efficient
special-case, average-case, or approximation techniques.
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7. Exploiting classical knowledge and clustering possible worldsIn this section, we give some more sophisticated characterizations of the solutions
of POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {0,me,mc}, by
decision and optimization problems involving a system of linear constraints. We show
how classical knowledge can be exploited and how variables can be clustered into
equivalence classes in order to obtain a system of linear constraints that has fewer variables
and fewer linear constraints than the one in Section 6. Note that the characterizations
for TIGHT me-CONSEQUENCE, and TIGHT mc-CONSEQUENCE are new results, while
the characterizations for POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE are
essentially taken from [55].
7.1. Preliminaries
In the sequel, let P be a probabilistic logic program. We write P = (C,D) to denote that
C (respectively, D) is the set of all classical (respectively, purely probabilistic) members
of P (respectively, ground(P )). For sets of conditional constraintsF , we use |[F ]| to denote
the set of all conditional events ψ|φ such that (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈F for some l, u ∈ [0,1].
Roughly speaking, the main ideas behind exploiting classical knowledge and clustering
possible worlds can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce a variable only for every I ∈ IΦ that satisfies C, rather than for every
I ∈ IΦ . Moreover, we introduce up to two linear inequalities only for each member
of D, rather than for each member of ground(P ).
• We exploit the structure of the conditional events in D, which imposes an equivalence
relation on the set of all models I ∈ IΦ of C. We then introduce a variable only for
each equivalence class of possible worlds.
We first define a characterization of the above set of equivalence classes of possible
worlds. Given a set of classical conditional constraints C and a set of ground conditional
events E = {ε1, . . . , εn}, denote by RC(E) the set of all mappings r that assign every εi =
ψi |φi ∈ E ∪ {|} an element of {ψi ∧ φi,¬ψi ∧ φi,¬φi} such that C ∪ {r(εi) | εi ∈ E}
is satisfiable. We use ∧r to denote r(ε1) ∧ · · · ∧ r(εn). For such mappings r and ground
events φ, we use r |= φ to abbreviate ∧r |= φ.
The following lemma formulates the immediate result that RC(E) defines a partition
SC(E) of the set of all possible worlds I ∈ IΦ that satisfy C. That is, RC(E) defines an
equivalence relation on the set of all models I ∈ IΦ of C.
Lemma 7.1. Let C be a set of classical conditional constraints, and let E be a finite
set of ground conditional events. Then, the family SC(E) = {Sr | r ∈ RC(E)}, where
Sr = {I ∈ IΦ | I |= C ∪ {∧r}}, is a partition of {I ∈ IΦ | I |= C}.
We next show that the set of conditional events E can be interpreted by a probability
function over SC(E). That is, as far as E is concerned, we do not need the fine granulation
of {I ∈ IΦ | I |= C}. To formulate this result, we introduce the notion of measurability in
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RC(E). We say that a ground event φ is measurable in RC(E) iff for all r ∈ RC(E), it
holds that I |= φ for some I ∈ Sr iff I |= φ for all I ∈ Sr . A ground conditional event
ψ|φ is measurable in RC(E) iff φ and ψ ∧ φ are measurable in RC(E). Intuitively,
φ (respectively, ψ|φ) is measurable in RC(E) iff it can be interpreted by a probability
function over SC(E). In particular,  and all ψ|φ ∈ E are measurable in RC(E), as the
following immediate lemma shows, which also implies that all ¬φ and ¬ψ ∧ φ with
ψ|φ ∈E are measurable in RC(E).
Lemma 7.2. Let C be a set of classical conditional constraints and E be a finite set of
ground conditional events. Then,  and all ψ|φ ∈E are measurable in RC(E).
The next result shows that the models of a probabilistic logic program P = (C,D)
correspond to the solutions of a system of linear constraints in which we have one variable
for each r ∈RC(|[D]|) and up to two linear constraints for each F ∈D. This result follows
immediately from Theorem 6.1 and Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2.
Theorem 7.3. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program. Let the parameters δ, F ,
and R be given by δ = , F = D, and R = RC(|[D]|). Then:
(a) For every model Pr of P , there exists a solution (yr)r∈R of the system of linear
constraints LC(δ,F ,R) such that Pr(r)= yr for all r ∈ R.
(b) For every solution (yr)r∈R of the system of linear constraints LC(δ,F ,R), there exists
a model Pr of P such that yr = Pr(r) for all r ∈R.
The index set RC(|[D]|) of the new system of linear constraints can be computed
using Algorithm index_set_2 from [55]. The following proposition shows that for ground
conjunctive probabilistic logic programs P , the set RC(|[D]|) can be computed in time
O(|D|‖P‖|RC(|[D]|)|), where |S| denotes the cardinality of a set S, and ‖P‖ denotes
the input size of P . This shows that the index set RC(|[D]|) can be computed in output-
polynomial total time (see especially [18]).
Proposition 7.4. Given a ground conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D),
computing RC(|[D]|) can be done in time O(|D|‖P‖|RC(|[D]|)|).
7.2. Positive probability
The following theorem shows that POSITIVE PROBABILITY can be reduced to the
solvability of a system of linear constraints similar to the one in Theorem 7.3. This result
follows immediately from Theorem 6.3 and Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2.
Theorem 7.5. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground
event. Then, P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff the system of linear constraints
LC(δ,F ,R) is solvable, where δ = α, F = D, and R = RC(|[D]| ∪ {α|}).
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7.3. Tight logical consequenceLet P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q= ∃(β|α)[x, y] be an object-
ground probabilistic query where P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. The next theorem shows that also the
tight answer substitution for Q to P under logical entailment can be computed by solving
two linear programs with a system of linear constraints as in Theorem 7.3. This result is
immediate by Theorem 6.5 and Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2.
Theorem 7.6. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q= ∃(β|α) [x, y]
be an object-ground probabilistic query such that P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. Then, the tight answer
substitution for Q to P under logical entailment is given by σ = {x/l, y/u}, where l
(respectively, u) is the optimal value of the following linear program over the variables yr




yr subject to LC(δ,F ,R). (7)
7.4. Tight consequence under maximum entropy
Consider again a probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and an object-ground
probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] where P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. We now show that exploiting
classical knowledge and clustering possible worlds can also be done when computing the
tight answer substitution for Q to P under me-entailment. The following lemma states
the auxiliary result that all possible worlds in the same equivalence class have the same
probability under the me-model of P .
Lemma 7.7. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program. Let R = RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α}).
Then, for all I1, I2 ∈ IΦ such that I1, I2 |= C ∪ {∧r} for some r ∈ R, it holds that
me[P ](I1)= me[P ](I2).
The following theorem shows how the tight answer substitution for Q to P under me-
entailment can be characterized through the optimal solution of an optimization problem
that has a system of linear constraints similar to the one in Theorem 7.3. This result can be
proved using Lemmas 7.1, 7.2, and 7.7. Note that the objective function involves weights
ar (r ∈R), where each ar is given by the number of all possible worlds I ∈ IΦ that belong
to the equivalence class Sr .
Theorem 7.8. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q = ∃(β|α)
[x, y] be an object-ground probabilistic query with P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ α. Let δ = , F = D,
and R = RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α}). For r ∈ R, let ar = |{I ∈ IΦ | I |= C ∪ {∧r}}|. Then, the
tight answer substitution for Q to P under me-entailment is given by σ = {x/d, y/d},
where d = (∑r∈R,r |=β∧α y
r )/(∑r∈R,r |=α y
r ) and y
r (r ∈ R) is the optimal solution of the




yr(logyr − logar) subject to LC(δ,F ,R). (8)
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In the following two subsections, we briefly discuss the problem of computing the
weights ar (r ∈R) and the problem of solving the optimization problem (8).
7.5. Computing the weights ar
We now discuss how to compute the weights ar (r ∈ R) in Theorem 7.8. In the sequel,
let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y] be an object-
ground probabilistic query. Let R = RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α}).
In general, the weights ar = |{I ∈ IΦ | I |= C ∪ {∧r}}| with r ∈R can be computed by
simply counting all I ∈ IΦ such that I |= C ∪ {∧r}.
In the case of conjunctive P and Q, they can be computed more efficiently by solving
one system of linear equations. Let S = R∅(|[ground(P )]| ∪ {β|α}). For every s ∈ S,
let Is be the set of all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ with s |= p. By Lemma 7.1, the set
S partitions IΦ into the sets {I ∈ IΦ | I |= ∧s}. We now first compute the numbers
bs = |{I ∈ IΦ | I |= ∧s}| with s ∈ S, which are the unique solution of the following system
of linear equations (assuming that P and Q are conjunctive):∑
s∈S,Is
⊆Is
bs = 2|HBΦ |−|Is
 | (for all s
 ∈ S).




bs (for all r ∈R).
7.6. Solving the optimization problem
The optimization problem (8) can be solved by standard Lagrange techniques (as, e.g.,
described in [78,82,88]). Here, we can build on existing maximum entropy technology. For
instance, the maximum entropy system PIT [21,82] solves entropy maximization problems
subject to indifferent possible worlds (which are known to have the same probability in me-
models, cf. Lemma 7.7). This comes down to working with the index set RC(|[D]|∪{β|α}).
Therefore, PIT can be directly used to solve the optimization problem (8). The medical
system LEXMED 3 [21,81,82] is based on PIT and supports physicians in diagnosing
appendicitis in a German hospital (cf. [80]). SPIRIT 4 [59,75,76,78] is another system shell
using the principle of maximum entropy to represent sets of probabilistic rules and to
answer queries.
To compute the me-model of some finite set of ground conditional constraints P ,
both PIT and SPIRIT adopt the conditional constraints in P successively and iteratively.
Both systems make use of tree-like structures to reduce the complexity of probabilistic
interpretations: The conditional constraints are learned on adequate component (or
marginal) distributions, and the changed probabilities are propagated through the tree.
So, like the clique trees of Bayesian networks [35,47,60,70], these trees also allow local
3 Homepage of LEXMED: https://lexmed.fh-weingarten.de/.
4 Available at http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/BWLOR/forsch.html.
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computations and propagations of probabilities. It is worth noticing that the Lagrange
factors α+ψ |φ and α
−
ψ |φ occurring in (1), which are so meaningful for the theoretical results
on maximum entropy reasoning (see [39,41]), are also of crucial importance for the
efficient computation in SPIRIT.
In principle, the proper handling of inequality constraints in (8) is no problem: The me-
model of P fulfills some of the constraints in (8) with equality, some with strict inequality
(cf. [24,88]). Therefore, me[P ] is still of the form (1), with some of the factors α+ψ |φ and
α−ψ |φ equal to 1. Unfortunately, no method is known to decide in advance which of the
constraints are essential to compute the me-model (those where equality holds) and which
are irrelevant (those where inequality holds). PIT uses heuristics to solve this problem
when iteratively learning the conditional constraints; for a detailed description, see [82].
8. Efficient reductions
In this section, we present efficient reductions of instances of POSITIVE PROBABILITY
and TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {0,me,mc}, to smaller instances of these
problems. They are to be applied before generating the sophisticated systems of linear
constraints in Theorems 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.8. They all aim at reducing their number of
variables, which can be done by adding further classical knowledge and by reducing the
number of ground instances of purely probabilistic conditional constraints. This can be
achieved by (i) making hidden classical knowledge explicit, (ii) by removing vacuous
conditional constraints, (iii) by removing inactive conditional constraints, and (iv) by
decomposing a probabilistic logic program. Here, (i), (ii), and (iv) apply to the general
case, while (iii) applies only to the conjunctive case. It is important to point out that we
show that (i)–(iii) can be done in polynomial time in the ground conjunctive case, and that
(iv) can be done in linear time in the ground case. Note that (i)–(iii) are refinements of
implicit techniques in [49,55], while (iv) is inspired by similar methods in [19,58].
8.1. Adding classical conditional constraints
We now describe a technique, which adds to a probabilistic logic program logically
entailed classical conditional constraints. Observe that any newly derived classical
conditional constraint reduces the number of variables in the systems of linear constraints
in Theorems 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.8.
In the sequel, let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let K be a set
of classical conditional constraints. We first define the functions trivK and triv
K , which
associate with D a set of ground classical conditional constraints that trivially follow from
K and D. The function trivK assigns to D the set of all conditional constraints ⊥ ⇐ φ
(that is, (φ|)[0,0]) such that either
(i) K |= ⊥ ⇐ ψ ∧ φ, (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈D, and l > 0, or
(ii) K |= ψ ⇐ φ, (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈D, and u < 1, or
(iii) K |= ψ1 ∧ φ1 ⇔ ψ2 ∧ φ2, K |= φ1 ⇔ φ2, (ψ1|φ1)[l1, u1] ∈ D, (ψ2|φ2)[l2, u2] ∈ D,
and [l1, u1] ∩ [l2, u2] = ∅.
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We then define triv0 (D) = ∅ and trivn+1(D) = trivK∪trivn (D)(D) for all n > 0. We finallyK K K
define triv
K(D) = trivnK(D), where n is the least number n  0 such that trivnK(D) =
trivn+1K (D).
The following theorem shows that, as far as POSITIVE PROBABILITY is concerned, we
can simply add the classical conditional constraints in triv
C(D) to P . It follows from the
fact that P is logically equivalent to P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D).
Theorem 8.1. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground
event. Let P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D). Then, P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff P
 has a model
Pr with Pr(α) > 0.
The following example illustrates the above P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D).
Example 8.2. Consider the probabilistic logic program P = (C,D), where C = {⊥ ⇐
f∧g} and D = {(e|f )[0.4,0.5], (f |g)[0.6,0.8]}. Then, we obtain triv
C(D) = {⊥ ⇐ g},
and thus P
 = P ∪ {⊥ ⇐ g}.
The next theorem shows that, as far as TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE is concerned, where
s ∈ {0,me,mc}, we can also simply add the classical conditional constraints in triv
C(D)
to P . This result follows from P and P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D) being logically equivalent and
from CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(P 
,β ∧ α).
Theorem 8.3. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a
ground conditional constraint. Let P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D). Then, for every s ∈ {0,me,mc}, it
holds that P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u].
The following proposition shows that, in the ground conjunctive case, triv
C(D) can be
computed in time O(‖P‖|D|3), where ‖P‖ denotes the input size of P , and |D| denotes
the cardinality of D, that is, in polynomial time. It follows from the well-known result
that for finite sets of ground conjunctive conditional constraints K and ground conjunctive
conditional events ψ|φ, deciding whether K |= ⊥ ⇐ ψ ∧ φ (respectively, K |= ψ ⇐ φ)
holds can be done in linear time.
Proposition 8.4. Given a ground conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D),
computing triv
C(D) can be done in time O(‖P‖|D|3).
8.2. Removing vacuous conditional constraints
Another technique towards an increased efficiency is to remove conditional constraints
that are vacuous by our classical knowledge.
In the sequel, let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program. A conditional constraint
(ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D is vacuous under C iff either (i) C |= ⊥ ⇐ φ, or (ii) C |= ⊥ ⇐ ψ ∧ φ and
l = 0, or (iii) C |= ψ ⇐ φ and u = 1, or (iv) l = 0 and u = 1. We use vacC(D) to denote
the set of all vacuous members of D under C.
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The following theorem shows that P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff its equivalent
without vacuous conditional constraints P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)) has such a model. It
follows from the fact that P and P
 are logically equivalent.
Theorem 8.5. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground
event. Let P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)). Then, P has a model Pr with Pr(α)>0 iff P
 has a
model Pr with Pr(α) > 0.
We give an example to illustrate the above P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)).
Example 8.6. Consider the probabilistic logic program P = (C,D), where C = {⊥ ⇐ g}
and D = {(e|f )[0.4,0.5], (f |g)[0.6,0.8]}. Then, we obtain vacC(D) = {(f |g)[0.6,0.8]},
and thus P
 = {⊥ ⇐ g, (e|f )[0.4,0.5]}.
The next theorem shows that, for s ∈ {0,me,mc}, s-entailment from P coincides with
s-entailment from P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)). This result follows from P and P
 being
logically equivalent and from CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(P 
,β ∧ α).
Theorem 8.7. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u] be
a ground conditional constraint. Let P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)). Then, for every s ∈
{0,me,mc}, it holds that P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u].
The following proposition shows that in the ground conjunctive case, vacC(D) can be
computed in time O(‖P‖|D|), that is, in polynomial time.
Proposition 8.8. Given a ground conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D),
computing vacC(D) can be done in time O(‖P‖|D|).
8.3. Removing inactive conditional constraints
We next describe a reduction, which only applies to the conjunctive case, and which
characterizes some ground purely probabilistic conditional constraints as s-inactive, and
simply removes them. Note that similar techniques have also proved to be useful in default
reasoning from conditional knowledge bases [19].
In the sequel, let P = (C,D) be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program. We now
define the strong classical approximation of P , which is a superset of the classical
approximation of P . Moreover, we define the notion of s-active formulas relative to the
strong classical approximation of P . More formally, the strong classical approximation
of P , denoted s-app(P ), is the set of all ψ ⇐ φ such that (i) (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P )
for some l > 0, and (ii) C‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ. Given a ground conjunctive event α, a ground
atom p ∈ HBΦ is s-active w.r.t. P and α iff s-app(P ) ∪ {α} |= p. A ground event γ
(respectively, ground conditional constraint F ) is s-active w.r.t. P and α iff all ground
atoms in γ (respectively, F ) are s-active w.r.t. P and α. A ground atom (respectively,
ground event, ground conditional constraint) is s-inactive w.r.t. P and α iff it is not s-active
w.r.t. P and α. We use actC,α(D) to denote the set of (i) all members of D that are s-active
G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202 175
w.r.t. C ∪ D and α, and (ii) all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (a) φ is s-active w.r.t. C ∪ D and α, and
(b) (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D for some l > 0 and some ψ that is s-inactive w.r.t. C ∪ D and α. The
following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 8.9. Let P = (C,D) be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let α
be a ground conjunctive event. Then, app(P ) ⊆ s-app(P ). Moreover, if a ground atom
p ∈ HBΦ is active w.r.t. P and α, then it is also s-active w.r.t. P and α.
The following theorem shows that deciding if P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 can be
reduced to deciding whether C ∪ actC,α(D) has such a model. Roughly, it follows from
the result that every s-inactive ground atom w.r.t. P and α can always be assigned the
probability zero under models Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0.
Theorem 8.10. Let P = (C,D) be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let α
be a ground conjunctive event. Let P
 = C ∪ actC,α(D). Then, P has a model Pr with
Pr(α) > 0 iff P
 has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0.
The following example illustrates the above result.
Example 8.11. Consider the conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D), where
C = {e ⇐ f } and D = {(f |e)[0.1,0.2], (g|f)[0.1,0.2], (h|g)[0,0.2]}. Does P have a
model Pr such that Pr(e) > 0? Then, since
s-app(P ) ∪ {e} = {e ⇐ f,f ⇐ e, g ⇐ f, e},
the ground atoms e, f , and g are all s-active w.r.t. P and e, while h is not s-active w.r.t.
P and e. Thus, actC,e(D) = {(f |e)[0.1,0.2], (g|f)[0.1,0.2]}. By Theorem 8.10, P has a
model Pr with Pr(e) > 0 iff C ∪ actC,e(D) has such a model.
The next result shows that, for s ∈ {0,mc}, s-entailment of ground conjunctive
conditional constraints (β|α)[l, u] from P coincides with s-entailment of (β|α)[l, u] from
C ∪ actC,β∧α(D). Note that this result does not carry over to me-entailment.
Theorem 8.12. Let P = (C,D) be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program and
(β|α)[l, u] be a ground conjunctive conditional constraint. Let P
 = C ∪ actC,β∧α(D).
Then, for every s ∈ {0,mc}, P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u].
The following proposition shows that, in the ground conjunctive case, computing the set
actC,α(D) can be done in time O(‖P‖|P | + ‖α‖), where ‖α‖ denotes the input size of α,
that is, in polynomial time.
Proposition 8.13. Given a ground conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and
a ground conjunctive event α, computing actC,α(D) can be done in time O(‖P‖|P |+‖α‖).
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8.4. DecompositionWe now describe a reduction, which is based on the decomposition of the set of all
purely probabilistic ground instances of a probabilistic logic program.
In the sequel, let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground
event. We use At(α) to denote the set of all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ that occur in α. We use
HBP,α to denote HBP ∪ At(α). The decomposition of HBP,α w.r.t. P and α is the unique
partition {H1, . . . ,Hk} of HBP,α such that (i) each member of ground(P ) is defined over
some Hi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (ii) α is defined over some Hi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and (iii)
k  1 is maximal. For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, denote by Di the set of all members of D that are
defined over Hi . We call {D1, . . . ,Dk} the decomposition of D w.r.t. C and α, denoted
decC,α(D). We call the unique Di such that (i) At(α) ⊆ Hi , and (ii) i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is
minimal, the relevant subset of D w.r.t. C and α, denoted relC,α(D).
The following result shows that P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff C ∪ relC,α(D) has
such a model and all the other C ∪ Di ’s are satisfiable. Here, the “⇒”-part is immediate.
The “⇐”-part follows from the fact that a model Pr of P can be constructed from
models Pri of the C ∪Di ’s by assuming probabilistic independence.
Theorem 8.14. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground
event. Suppose that decC,α(D)= {D1, . . . ,Dk} and relC,α(D) = D1. Then, P has a model
Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff
(i) C ∪D1 has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0, and
(ii) for every i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, it holds that C ∪Di is satisfiable.
The following example illustrates the above result.
Example 8.15. Let the probabilistic logic program P = (C,D), which is defined over the
set of ground atoms HBP = {e, f, g,h, k, l}, be given as follows:
P = ({e ⇐ f },{(f |e∧ g)[ 34 ,1], (¬e ∨ f |g)[35 ,1],
(h|k ∧ l)[ 23 ,1], (k|h∧ l)[ 58 ,1]}).
Then, the decomposition of D w.r.t. C and e is given by decC,e(D)= {D1,D2}, where D1
and D2 over H1 = {e, f, g} and H2 = {h, k, l}, respectively, are given by:
D1 =
{
(f |e∧ g)[ 34 ,1], (¬e ∨ f |g)[35 ,1]},
D2 =
{
(h|k ∧ l)[ 23 ,1], (k|h∧ l)[ 58 ,1]}.
By Theorem 8.14, P has a model Pr with Pr(e) > 0 iff (i) C ∪ D1 has a model Pr with
Pr(e) > 0, and (ii) C ∪D2 is satisfiable.
The following theorem shows that computing tight answer substitutions for object-
ground queries Q to P under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment can be reduced to computing
tight answer substitutions for Q to C ∪ relC,β∧α(D) under 0-, me-, and mc-entailment,
respectively, and to checking satisfiability of the other C ∪Dj .
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Theorem 8.16. Let P = (C,D) be a probabilistic logic program, and let (β|α)[l, u]
be a ground conditional constraint. Suppose that decC,β∧α(D) = {D1, . . . ,Dk} and
relC,β∧α(D) = D1. Then, for every s ∈ {0,me,mc}:
(a) If every C ∪ Di with i ∈ {2, . . . , k} is satisfiable, then P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff C ∪
D1‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u].
(b) Otherwise, P‖∼stight (β|α)[1,0].
The following result shows that, in the ground case, computing the decomposition and
the relevant subset can be done in time O(‖P‖ + ‖α‖), that is, in linear time. It follows
from a reduction to the problem of computing the connected components of a hypergraph,
which can be done in linear time.
Proposition 8.17. Given a ground probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and a ground
event α, decC,α(D) and relC,α(D) can be computed in time O(‖P‖ + ‖α‖).
9. Reduction-based algorithms
In this section, we present algorithms for solving the problems POSITIVE PROBABILITY
and TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {0,me,mc}, which are based on the techniques
of exploiting classical knowledge and clustering possible worlds of Section 7 and on the
efficient reductions described in Section 8.
Here, POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE are reduced to the
problems of deciding whether a system of linear constraints has a feasible solution and
of computing the optimal value of a linear program, which can be solved with standard
linear optimization technology [11,83]. In particular, column generation techniques have
been successfully applied to solve large problem instances in probabilistic propositional
logics (see especially the works by Kavvadias and Papadimitriou [37], Jaumard et al. [33],
Andersen and Hooker [1], and Hansen et al. [30]).
9.1. Positive probability
Algorithm Positive_Probability (see Fig. 3) decides, given a probabilistic logic program
P = (C,D) and a ground event α, whether P has a model Pr such that Pr(α) > 0. In step
1, we add trivially entailed classical knowledge to C. In step 2, we then check whether
already C logically entails ⊥ ⇐ α. In step 3, we then remove all vacuous conditional
constraints from D, while in step 4, in the conjunctive case, we remove all s-inactive
conditional constraints from D. In steps 5–7, we decide whether C ∪ relC,α(D) has a
model Pr with Pr(α) > 0, while in steps 8–11, we decide whether all the other C ∪ Di
where Di ∈ decC,α(D) are satisfiable.
The following theorem shows that Algorithm Positive_Probability is correct. It follows
immediately from Theorems 7.5, 8.1, 8.5, 8.10, and 8.14.
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Algorithm Positive_Probability
Input: Probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and ground event α.
Output: “No”, if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α; “Yes”, otherwise.




2. if C‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α then return “No”;
3. D := D − vacC(D);
4. if C ∪D and α are conjunctive then D := actC,α(D);
5. Di := relC,α(D);
6. R := RC(|[Di ]| ∪ {α|});
7. if LC(α,Di,R) is unsolvable then return “No”;
8. for each Di ∈ decC,α(D)− {relC,α(D)} do begin
9. R := RC(|[Di ]|);
10. if LC(,Di ,R) is unsolvable then return “No”
11. end;
12. return “Yes”.
Fig. 3. Algorithm Positive_Probability.
Theorem 9.1. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let α be a ground event. Then,
Positive_Probability(P,α) is “No”, if P‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α, and “Yes”, otherwise.
The following example illustrates Algorithm Positive_Probability.
Example 9.2. Let P = (C,D) be the probabilistic logic program given in Example 4.1,
and let α = ad(u, a). To decide whether there exists a model Pr of P such that Pr(α) >
0, Algorithm Positive_Probability generates a system of six linear constraints over six
variables, as the following construction shows.
The sets C and D are given as follows:
C = {(ro(h,u) | )[1,1], (ro(u, a) | )[1,1], (ro(a, o) | )[1,1],(
ad(h,u) | )[1,1], (re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ ad(R,S))[1,1],(
so(a, o) | )[1,1], (re(R,S) | re(R,T )∧ re(T ,S))[1,1]},
D = ground({(ad(u, a) | )[0.8,0.9], (re(R,S) | ro(R,S))[0.7,1],(
re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ so(R,S))[0.9,1]}).
Algorithm Positive_Probability now runs through steps 1–3 without changing C and D. In
particular, it does not stop at step 2, as C does not logically entail ⊥ ⇐ α. Since C ∪D and
α are conjunctive, we compute actC,α(D) in step 4. For this, we first compute the strong
classical approximation of P , which is given as follows:
s-app(P ) = ground({(ro(h,u) | )[1,1], (ro(u, a) | )[1,1], (ro(a, o) | )[1,1],(
ad(h,u) | )[1,1], (re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ ad(R,S))[1,1],(
so(a, o) | )[1,1], (re(R,S) | re(R,T )∧ re(T ,S))[1,1],(
ad(u,a) | )[1,1], (re(R,S) | ro(R,S))[1,1],(
re(R,S) | ro(R,S)∧ so(R,S))[1,1]}).
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The set of all ground atoms p ∈ HBΦ that are s-active w.r.t. P and α is given by the
least Herbrand model of s-app(P ) ∪ {ad(u, a)}, and thus given as follows:{
ro(h,u), ro(u, a), ro(a, o),ad(h,u),ad(u, a), so(a, o),
re(h,u), re(u, a), re(a, o), re(h, a), re(u, o), re(h, o)
}
.
The set actC,α(D) is then given as follows:
actC,α(D) =
{(
re(u, a) | ro(u, a))[0.7,1], (re(a, o) | ro(a, o))[0.7,1],(
ad(u, a) | )[0.8,0.9], (re(a, o) | ro(a, o)∧ so(a, o))[0.9,1]}.
It is easy to verify that in steps 5 and 8, it holds that Di = relC,α(D) = actC,α(D) and
decC,α(D) = {actC,α(D)}, respectively, and thus we only have to decide whether the
system of linear constraints LC(α,actC,α(D),R) in step 7 is solvable. Here, we have the
index set R = {ri | i ∈ {0, . . . ,5}}, where the ri ’s correspond to the leaves of the directed
tree shown in Fig. 4. More precisely, every ∧ri is logically equivalent to the conjunction of
all labels along the path from the root labeled  to the leaf associated with ri . For example,
∧r5 is logically equivalent to ro(u, a)∧ re(u, a)∧ ro(a, o)∧ re(a, o)∧ ad(u, a)∧ so(a, o).
The system of linear constraints LC(α,actC,α(D),R) is then given as follows (where each
variable yi with i ∈ {0, . . . ,5} corresponds to ri ):
y3 + y5 = 1,
−0.7 · (y0 + y1)+ 0.3 · (y2 + y3 + y4 + y5) 0,
−0.7 · (y0 + y2 + y3)+ 0.3 · (y1 + y4 + y5) 0,
−0.8 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y4)+ 0.2 · (y3 + y5) 0,
0.9 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y4)− 0.1 · (y3 + y5) 0,
−0.9 · (y0 + y2 + y3)+ 0.1 · (y1 + y4 + y5) 0,
yi  0 (for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,5}).
Fig. 4. Semantic tree for Example 9.2.
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This system is solvable, and thus Algorithm Positive_Probability returns “Yes” in step 12.
By Theorem 9.1, P has a model Pr such that Pr(α) > 0.
9.2. Tight logical consequence
Algorithm Tight_0_Consequence (see Fig. 5) computes, given a probabilistic logic
program P = (C,D) and an object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y], the
tight answer substitution for Q to P under logical entailment. In steps 1–3, we first
check whether P logically entails either ⊥ ⇐ α, or ⊥ ⇐ β ∧ α, or β ⇐ α, which can
be done using Algorithm Positive_Probability. If this is the case, then we immediately
return either {x/1, y/0}, or {x/0, y/0}, or {x/1, y/1}, respectively. Otherwise, in step
4, we add to C some classical knowledge that is entailed by P . Here, the set of all
added classical conditional constraints is a superset of triv
C(D) and can be computed
using Algorithm Positive_Probability. In steps 5–6, we then remove all vacuous and s-
inactive conditional constraints. In steps 7–9, we finally compute the interval [l, u] such
that C ∪ relC,β∧α(D)‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u].
The following theorem shows that Algorithm Tight_0_Consequence is correct. This
result follows immediately from Theorem 7.6, a slight generalization of Theorem 8.3, and
Theorems 8.7, 8.12, and 8.16.
Theorem 9.3. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q be an object-ground
probabilistic query. Then, Tight_0_Consequence(P,Q) is the tight answer substitution
for Q to P under logical entailment.
We give an example to illustrate Algorithm Tight_0_Consequence.
Example 9.4. Consider the probabilistic logic program P given in Example 4.1 and
the object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(re(h, o) | ad(u, a))[X,Y ]. In order to
compute the tight answer substitution for Q to P under logical entailment, Algorithm
Tight_0_Consequence generates two linear programs, each of which consists of only six
linear constraints over seven variables.
Algorithm Tight_0_Consequence
Input: Probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x,y].
Output: Tight answer substitution σ for Q to P under logical entailment.
1. if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α then return σ = {x/1, y/0}
2. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ β then return σ = {x/0, y/0}
3. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ ¬β then return σ = {x/1, y/1};
4. C := C ∪ {⊥ ⇐ φ | ∃(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈D:P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ φ};
5. D := D − vacC(D);
6. if C ∪D and α ∧ β are conjunctive then D := actC,β∧α(D);
7. D := relC,β∧α(D);
8. R := RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α});
9. l (respectively, u) := min (respectively, max) ∑r∈R,r |=β∧α yr subject to LC(α,D,R);
10. return σ = {x/l, y/u}.
Fig. 5. Algorithm Tight_0_Consequence.
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In detail, we have β = re(h, o) and α = ad(u, a). The system of linear constraints
LC(α,D,R) that we use in step 9 is then given through D = actC,β∧α(D), which coincides
with actC,α(D) of Example 9.2, and R = {ri | i ∈ {0, . . . ,6}}, where the ri ’s correspond to
the leaves of the directed tree in Fig. 6. The two linear programs are then given as follows
(where each yi with i ∈ {0, . . . ,6} corresponds to ri ):
minimize (respectively, maximize) y4 + y6
subject to
y3 + y4 + y6 = 1,
−0.7 · (y0 + y1)+ 0.3 · (y2 + y3 + y4 + y5 + y6) 0,
−0.7 · (y0 + y2 + y3 + y4)+ 0.3 · (y1 + y5 + y6) 0,
−0.8 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y5)+ 0.2 · (y3 + y4 + y6) 0,
0.9 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y5)− 0.1 · (y3 + y4 + y6) 0,
−0.9 · (y0 + y2 + y3 + y4)+ 0.1 · (y1 + y5 + y6) 0,
yi  0 (for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,6}).
The optimal values are 0.875 and 1, respectively. Thus, by Theorem 9.3, the tight answer
substitution for Q to P under logical entailment is {X/0.875, Y/1}.
9.3. Tight consequence under maximum entropy
Tight answer substitutions under me-entailment can be computed with Algorithm
Tight_me_Consequence (see Fig. 7), which resembles Tight_0_Consequence. The only
differences are that, in Tight_me_Consequence, we cannot remove anymore s-inactive
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Algorithm Tight_me_Consequence
Input: Probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x,y].
Output: Tight answer substitution σ for Q to P under me-entailment.
1. if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α then return σ = {x/1, y/0}
2. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ β then return σ = {x/0, y/0}
3. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ ¬β then return σ = {x/1, y/1};
4. C := C ∪ {⊥ ⇐ φ | ∃(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈D:P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ φ};
5. D := D − vacC(D);
6. D := relC,β∧α(D);
7. R := RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α});
8. compute the weights ar (r ∈ R);
9. compute the optimal solution y
r (r ∈ R) of the optimization problem
10. max−∑r∈R yr (logyr − logar ) subject to LC(,D,R);
11. d := (∑r∈R,r |=β∧α y
r )/(∑r∈R,r |=α y
r );
12. return σ = {x/d,y/d}.
Fig. 7. Algorithm Tight_me_Consequence.
conditional constraints (step 6 of Tight_0_Consequence), and we perform an entropy
maximization in steps 7–11 rather than solving two linear programs (steps 7–9 of
Tight_0_Consequence).
The next result shows that Algorithm Tight_me_Consequence is correct. It is immediate
by a slight generalization of Theorem 8.3 and Theorems 7.8, 8.7, and 8.16.
Theorem 9.5. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q be an object-ground
probabilistic query. Then, Tight_me_Consequence(P,Q) is the tight answer substitution
for Q to P under me-entailment.
9.4. Tight consequence under maximum entropy and CWA
Given a conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and a conjunctive object-
ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(β|α)[x, y], the tight answer substitution for Q to
P under mc-entailment can be computed with Algorithm Tight_mc_Conse-quence (see
Fig. 8), which is nearly identical to Algorithm Tight_me_Consequence, except that we
now also remove s-inactive conditional constraints in step 6.
The following theorem shows that Algorithm Tight_mc_Consequence is correct. This
result follows immediately from Theorem 7.8, a slight generalization of Theorem 8.3, and
Theorems 8.7, 8.12, and 8.16.
Theorem 9.6. Let P be a probabilistic logic program, and let Q be an object-ground
probabilistic query. Then, Tight_mc_Consequence(P,Q) is the tight answer substitution
for Q to P under mc-entailment.
The following example illustrates Algorithm Tight_mc_Consequence.
Example 9.7. Consider again the probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) of Example 4.1
and the object-ground probabilistic query Q = ∃(re(h, o) | ad(u, a))[X,Y ]. In order
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Algorithm Tight_mc_Consequence
Input: Conjunctive probabilistic logic program P = (C,D) and conjunctive object-ground probabilistic query
Q= ∃(β|α)[x,y].
Output: Tight answer substitution σ for Q to P under mc-entailment.
1. if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α then return σ = {x/1, y/0}
2. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ β then return σ = {x/0, y/0}
3. else if P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ α ∧ ¬β then return σ = {x/1, y/1};
4. C := C ∪ {⊥ ⇐ φ | ∃(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈D:P ‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ φ};
5. D := D − vacC(D);
6. D := actC,β∧α(D);
7. D := relC,β∧α(D);
8. R := RC(|[D]| ∪ {β|α});
9. compute the weights ar (r ∈R);
10. compute the optimal solution y
r (r ∈ R) of the optimization problem
11. max−∑r∈R yr (logyr − logar ) subject to LC(,D,R);
12. d := (∑r∈R,r |=β∧α y
r )/(∑r∈R,r |=α y
r );
13. return σ = {x/d,y/d}.
Fig. 8. Algorithm Tight_mc_Consequence.
to compute the tight answer substitution for Q to P under mc-entailment, Algorithm
Tight_mc_Consequence generates an entropy maximization problem subject to a system
of only six linear constraints over seven variables.




yr(logyr − logar) subject to LC(,D,R),
where D and R are the same as in Example 9.4, and every weight ar with r ∈ R is given
by |{I ∈ IΦ | I |= C ∪ {∧r}}|. Here, there are 18 possible worlds I ∈ IΦ such that I |= C,
which are partitioned as follows through R = {r0, . . . , r6}:
r0 =ˆ {J0, . . . , J5}, r1 =ˆ {J9, . . . , J13}, r2 =ˆ {J6, . . . , J8},
r3 =ˆ {J15}, r4 =ˆ {J16, J17}, r5 =ˆ {J14}, r6 =ˆ {J18}.
Thus, (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) = (6,5,3,1,2,1,1), and we get the following optimiza-






y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 + y5 + y6 = 1,
−0.7 · (y0 + y1)+ 0.3 · (y2 + y3 + y4 + y5 + y6) 0,
−0.7 · (y0 + y2 + y3 + y4)+ 0.3 · (y1 + y5 + y6) 0,
−0.8 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y5)+ 0.2 · (y3 + y4 + y6) 0,
0.9 · (y0 + y1 + y2 + y5)− 0.1 · (y3 + y4 + y6) 0,
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−0.9 · (y0 + y2 + y3 + y4)+ 0.1 · (y1 + y5 + y6) 0,
yi  0 (for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,6}).







i (i ∈ {0, . . . ,6}) is the optimal solution of the above
optimization problem. Numerically, it is {X/0.9632, Y/0.9632}.
10. Probabilistic logic programming under inheritance with overriding
Probabilistic logic programming under maximum entropy is closely related to proba-
bilistic logic programming under inheritance with overriding, which has been introduced
in a companion paper [54]. In detail, the notions of entailment under maximum entropy are
closely related to the notions of entailment under inheritance with overriding in [54], since
they all have very similar nonmonotonic properties, in particular, they all realize some
inheritance of probabilistic knowledge. Roughly, the main difference between entailment
under maximum entropy and entailment under inheritance with overriding is that the latter
preserves the imprecision expressed through the width of the probability intervals in a prob-
abilistic logic program, while the former always produces exact point values (for ground
probabilistic queries). In the following, we compare the notions of me- and mc-entailment
with one notion of entailment under inheritance with overriding, called lex-entailment [54].
We first reconsider some of our examples from Section 5.2 for a comparison of lex-
entailment with me- and mc-entailment. The following example concerns the property of
subclass inheritance and the aspects of irrelevance and exceptionality.
Example 10.1 (Tweety (continued)). Consider again the probabilistic logic program P
and the probabilistic queries Q ∈ {Q1, . . . ,Q5} given in Example 5.1. The tight answer
substitutions for these queries under lex-entailment compared to those under s-entailment,
where s ∈ {me,mc}, are shown in Table 5.
We observe that, differently from the notions of me- and mc-entailment, the notion of
lex-entailment preserves the imprecision of the original intervals in P , that is, it does not
produce exact point values. However, the general behavior of lex-entailment is very similar
to the one of me- and mc-entailment. More precisely, under lex-entailment, we observe
that probabilistic knowledge is also inherited along subclass relationships. Here, Tweety’s
exceptionality in its inability to fly has no effect on the probability of him having legs.
Furthermore, Robin’s ability to fly is not influenced by the irrelevant property of being red.
Table 5
Tight answer substitutions for Example 10.1
Probabilistic query me-entailment mc-entailment lex-entailment
Q1 {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98,Y/1.00}
Q2 {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98, Y/0.98} {X/0.98,Y/1.00}
Q3 {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90,Y/0.98}
Q4 {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90, Y/0.90} {X/0.90,Y/0.98}
Q5 {X/0.05, Y/0.05} {X/0.05, Y/0.05} {X/0.00,Y/0.05}
G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202 185
The next example shows how conflicting information is handled.Example 10.2. Consider again the probabilistic logic program P and the probabilistic
query Q given in Example 5.4. Under lex-entailment, the tight answer substitution for
this query is given by {X/0.00, Y/0.05}. Hence, under lex-entailment, the probabilistic
knowledge that penguins fly with a probability of at most 0.05 completely dominates the
probabilistic knowledge that metal-winged objects fly with a probability of at least 0.95,
while under me- and mc-entailment, the tight answer substitution {X/0.2127, Y/0.2127}
shows a combination of both pieces of probabilistic knowledge, with a slight bias towards
the first one.
Our last example shows how nonconflicting information is combined.
Example 10.3. Consider again the probabilistic logic program P and the probabilistic
query Q given in Example 5.5. Under lex-entailment, the tight answer substitution for this
query is given by {X/0.7, Y/0.8}, which is very close to the results under me- and mc-
entailment, which are both given by {X/0.7, Y/0.7}.
This similarity between lex-entailment and me- and mc-entailment is also reflected in
the general nonmonotonic properties. As shown in [54], lex-entailment also satisfies (i)
the rationality postulates Right Weakening, Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Cut,
Cautious Monotonicity, and Or, (ii) the property of Rational Monotonicity, and (iii) the
properties of Irrelevance and Direct Inference.
As for the computational complexity, the optimization problem TIGHT lex-CONSE-
QUENCE is FPNP-complete for ground probabilistic logic programs P in the general as
well as the 1-conjunctive case [54]. Thus, it has the same computational complexity as the
optimization problem TIGHT 0-CONSEQUENCE. There exists an algorithm that reduces
TIGHT lex-CONSEQUENCE to solving a number of linear optimization problems [54].
Notice that also this algorithm can be combined with the techniques presented in Sections 7
and 8 for an increased efficiency.
11. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented two approaches to probabilistic logic programming
under maximum entropy. The first one is based on the usual notion of entailment under
maximum entropy (me-entailment), and the second one on a new notion of entailment
under maximum entropy (mc-entailment) that couples the principle of maximum entropy
with the closed world assumption (CWA) from classical logic programming. We have
analyzed the nonmonotonic behavior of both approaches along benchmark examples and
along general properties for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. It turned
out that both approaches have very nice nonmonotonic features. Furthermore, we have
presented algorithms for computing tight intervals from probabilistic logic programs under
me- and mc-entailment, which are based on generalizations of techniques from [55]. In
particular, computing tight intervals under mc-entailment is reduced to an optimization
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problem of the same size as the one produced by computing tight intervals under logical
entailment in [55].
We have used the principle of maximum entropy as a way to overcome the inferential
weakness of model-theoretic logical entailment. This approach has a number of advantages
over the Bayesian network approaches in [27,31,32,64,72,73]: Since the latter approaches
originated from Bayesian networks, they all assume some strong structural restrictions
on probabilistic knowledge bases. In particular, they all require that the grounding of
a knowledge base is acyclic. Moreover, conditional probabilities are always given by a
precise point value, rather than by an interval. Our work, in contrast, is free from such
strong restrictions.
The me-model of a probabilistic logic program P automatically satisfies conditional
independencies that are implicitly entrenched in the structure of P . Roughly, we find
conditional independencies in the me-model where the available information does not
justify establishing a dependency. In general, however, the me-model of a probabilistic
logic program P that represents a fragment of a Bayesian network BN does not satisfy the
conditional independencies implicitly encoded in BN. However, a simulation of Bayesian
networks is possible through a slight modification of the usual me-approach: In order to
obtain maximum entropy models that automatically encode conditional independencies as
in Bayesian networks, one can use the principle of sequential maximum entropy introduced
in [53].
An interesting topic of future research is to generalize the notion of entailment under
maximum entropy and CWA to a larger class of probabilistic logic programs, beyond
those over conjunctive events. A closely related issue of further research is to extend the
reduction of removing s-inactive conditional constraints described in Section 8.3 to a larger
class of probabilistic logic programs.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Recall that P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] iff every model Pr of P is also a model
of (β|α)[l, u]. The latter is equivalent to Pr(β|α) ∈ [l, u] for every model Pr of P such that
Pr(α) > 0, which in turn is equivalent to Prα(β) ∈ [l, u] for every model Pr of P such that
Pr(α) > 0. This argumentation also shows that P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u] iff l (respectively, u) is
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the infimum (respectively, supremum) of Prα(β) subject to all models Pr of P such that
Pr(α) > 0. 
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma A.1. Let P be a conjunctive probabilistic logic program, and let α be a
ground conjunctive event. Then, for every model Pr of P , there exists a model Pr
 of
P ∪ CWA(P,α) such that Pr
(γ )= Pr(γ ) for every ground event γ that is active w.r.t. P
and α.
Proof. Let Pr be a model of P . We define Pr
 by Pr
(I ) = Pr(εI ) for all I ∈ IΦ with
I |= CWA(P,α), where εI is the conjunction of all active atoms p ∈ I and of all negations
of active atoms p /∈ I , and by Pr
(I ) = 0 for all other I ∈ IΦ . Clearly, Pr
 satisfies
CWA(P,α), and Pr
(γ ) = Pr(γ ) for all active ground events γ . Hence, Pr
 satisfies all
active members of ground(P ). We now show that Pr
 also satisfies all inactive members
of ground(P ). Suppose the contrary. That is, some inactive (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P )
exists such that Pr
 
|= (ψ|φ)[l, u]. It then follows that Pr
(φ) > 0, as otherwise Pr
 |=
(ψ|φ)[l, u]. Hence, φ is active, as otherwise Pr
(φ) = 0. Since (ψ|φ)[l, u] is inactive, it
thus follows that ψ is inactive. Hence, we obtain l > 0, as otherwise Pr
 |= (ψ|φ)[l, u].
Furthermore, as Pr(φ)= Pr
(φ) > 0, it follows that P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ. This shows in particular
that ψ ⇐ φ belongs to app(P ). But this contradicts φ being active and ψ being inactive.
This shows that Pr
 is also a model of all inactive members of ground(P ). 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. (⇒) Since the consequence relation ‖∼0 is monotonic, P‖∼0
(β|α)[l, u] implies P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u].
(⇐) Assume that (∗) P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. Towards a contradiction,
suppose now that P‖0 (β|α)[l, u]. That is, there exists a model Pr of P such that
Pr 
|= (β|α)[l, u]. Since (β|α)[l, u] is active, by Lemma A.1, there exists a model Pr
 of
P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧α) such that Pr
 
|= (β|α)[l, u]. But this then contradicts (∗). This shows
that P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We first show that P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) is logically equivalent to
P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α). Observe that P logically entails all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (a) φ is active
w.r.t. P and β∧α, and (b) (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) for some r > 0 and some ψ that is
inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Thus, every model of P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) is also a model of
P̂ ∪CWA(P,β∧α). To prove the converse, it is sufficient to show that P̂ ∪CWA(P,β∧α)
logically entails every (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) that is inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧α. Towards
a contradiction, assume that there exists a model Pr of P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) and some
inactive (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ) such that Pr 
|= (ψ|φ)[r, s]. Hence, Pr(φ) > 0, and thus
φ is active. Hence, ψ is inactive, and thus r > 0. Thus, ⊥ ⇐ φ belongs to P̂ . But this
contradicts Pr being a model of P̂ . Thus, P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) logically entails every
inactive (ψ|φ)[r, s] ∈ ground(P ). Hence, every model of P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) is also a
model of P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧α). In summary, P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧α) is logically equivalent to
P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α).
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By Theorem 3.2, P‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪CWA(P,β ∧α)‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. By the result
above, the latter is equivalent to P̂ ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. As P̂ and (β|α)[l, u]
contain only active p ∈ HBΦ , this is equivalent to P̂ ‖∼0 (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Recall that
P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
Since CWA(P,β ∧α) = CWA(P ∪CWA(P,β ∧α),β ∧α), as easily verified, the latter is
equivalent to P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) ∪ CWA(P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α), β ∧ α)‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
That is, P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Recall that
P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
By the proof of Theorem 3.3, P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α) is logically equivalent to P̂ ∪
CWA(P,β ∧ α). It is then easy to verify that CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(P̂ , β ∧ α). It thus
follows that P ∪CWA(P,β ∧α)‖∼me (β|α)[l, u] iff P̂ ∪CWA(P̂ , β ∧α)‖∼me (β|α)[l, u].
The latter is equivalent to P̂‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] and, as CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(P̂ , β ∧ α),
also to P̂‖∼me (β|α)[l, u]. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 5
We next prove Theorems 5.6–5.11. In the sequel, for ground probabilistic logic
programs P , and ground events φ, we define Modφ(P ) as follows:
Modφ(P ) =
{
Prφ | Pr |= P, Pr(φ) > 0
}
.
For the proof of Theorem 5.6 in the case s = mc, we need the following lemma,
respectively, its (immediate) corollary.
Lemma B.1. Let φ, ψ , ε, ε′ be ground conjunctive events, and let P be a (fixed) ground
conjunctive probabilistic logic program; set
P1 =
{
ψ ⇐ φ | (ψ|φ)[1,1] ∈ P, P‖0 (φ|)[0,0]}⊆ app(P ).
If P ∪ CWA(P, ε ∧ ε′)‖∼0 (ε ∧¬ε′|)[0,0], then P‖∼0 (ε|)[0,0], or P1 ∪ {ε} |= ε′.
Proof. Let ε = p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn, and let s1, . . . , sm be the other atoms which are entailed by
P1 ∪ {ε}, i.e., P1 ∪ {ε} |= p1, . . . , pn, s1, . . . , sm. Set I := {p1, . . . , pn, s1, . . . , sm} ∈ IΦ . In
particular, I |= ε. Assume I 
|= ε′, hence I |= ε∧¬ε′. By presupposition, P ∪CWA(P, ε∧
ε′) |= I [0,0]. Since each si is entailed by P1 ∪ {ε}, it is also entailed by app(P )∪ {ε ∧ ε′}.
Hence, P |= I [0,0]. Now, using the explicitness condition (3), there is (ρ2|ρ1)[c, c] ∈ P
such that either c = 1 and I |= ρ1 ∧ ¬ρ2, or c = 0 and I |= ρ1 ∧ ρ2. If c = 1, then
ρ2 ⇐ ρ1 ∈ P1, and I |= ρ1 ∧¬ρ2 is a contradiction to the choice of s1, . . . , sm. Thus, c = 0
and I |= ρ1 ∧ρ2, i.e., ρ1 ∧ρ2 is a conjunction of some of the atoms p1, . . . , pn, s1, . . . , sm.
But then, P‖∼0 (ε|)[0,0], as can be seen as follows: Let I ′ ∈ IΦ with I ′ |= ε. If there is
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an si ,1 i m, such that I ′ 
|= si , then P |= I ′[0,0], according to the choice of s1, . . . , sm.
Otherwise, I ′ |= s1, . . . , sm. Then also I ′ |= ρ1 ∧ρ2, and hence P |= I ′[0,0]. In either case,
P |= I ′[0,0]. 
Corollary B.2. If P ∪ CWA(P, ε ∧ ε′)‖∼0 (ε ∧ ¬ε′|)[0,0], then P‖∼0 (ε|)[0,0], or
app(P ) ∪ {ε} |= ε′.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Let ‖∼s be one of ‖∼0,‖∼me,‖∼mc, i.e., we consider the cases
s ∈ {0,me,mc} (except for RW, where we only consider s ∈ {0,me}.
RW. Let s = 0. If every model of (φ|)[l, u] satisfies (ψ|)[l′, u′], and (φ|)[l, u] is true
in all Pr ∈ Modε(P ), then (ψ|)[l′, u′] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε(P ), too.
Let s = me. Let Prme = me[P ] be the me-model of P . Due to P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u], we
have Prme |= (φ|ε)[l, u], that is, Prmeε |= (φ|)[l, u]. Then also Prmeε |= (ψ|)[l′, u′], since
(φ|ε)[l, u] ⇒ (ψ|)[l′, u′] is logically valid. But this means that Prme |= (ψ|ε)[l′, u′], and
thus P‖∼me (ψ|ε)[l′, u′].
Ref. Clearly, (ε|ε)[1,1] is true in all probabilistic interpretations Pr, in particular, in me[F ]
and in me[F ∪ CWA(F , ε)]. So, RW holds for each s ∈ {0,me,mc}.
LLE. If ε⇔ε′ is logically valid, then ε and ε′ are propositionally equivalent. So, Prε =
Prε′ for all probabilistic interpretations Pr. In particular, Prε |= (φ|)[l, u] iff Prε′ |=
(φ|)[l, u]. Setting Pr = me[P ] and Pr = me[P ∪CWA(P,φ∧ε)] = me[P ∪CWA(P,φ∧
ε′)], this proves the assertion for s = me and s = mc, respectively. For s = 0, we have
Modε(P ) = Modε′(P ). Hence, (φ|)[l, u] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε(P ) iff (φ|)[l, u] is
true in all Pr ∈ Modε′(P ).
Cut and CM. Let s = 0. If (ε′|)[1,1] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε(P ), then Modε∧ε′(P ) =
Modε(P ). Hence, (φ|)[l, u] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε∧ε′(P ) iff (φ|)[l, u] is true in all
Pr ∈ Modε(P ).
Let s = me, and let Prme = me[P ]. Suppose P‖∼me (ε′|ε)[1,1], that means, Prme |=
(ε′|ε)[1,1]. Then for all events α, Prme(α ∧ ε) = Prme(α ∧ ε ∧ ε′), due to Prme(ε ∧
¬ε′)= 0. Therefore, Prme |= (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u] iff Prme |= (φ|ε)[l, u].
Let s = mc. Here P‖∼mc (ε′|ε)[1,1] means me[P ∪ CWA(P, ε ∧ ε′)] |= ε ∧ ¬ε′[0,0],
and hence, due to the open mindedness principle (cf. [68]), P ∪ CWA(P, ε ∧ ε′)‖∼0
ε ∧ ¬ε′[0,0]. By Corollary B.2, P‖∼0 (ε|)[0,0], or app(P ) ∪ {ε} |= ε′. If P‖∼0
(ε|)[0,0], then both me[P ∪ CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε)] and me[P ∪ CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε ∧ ε′)] satisfy
(ε|)[0,0], and therefore, P‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u] iff P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u]. Otherwise, we have
app(P ) ∪ {ε} |= ε′, and consequently, CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε ∧ ε′) = CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε), which
implies me[P ∪ CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε ∧ ε′)] = me[P ∪ CWA(P,ψ ∧ ε)] =: Pr∗. Moreover,
Pr∗(ε ∧ ¬ε′) = 0, so that Pr∗(ψ|ε ∧ ε′) = Pr∗(ψ|ε). This shows P‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u]
iff P‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u]. Therefore, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity hold for s = mc.
Or. Let s = 0. Assume that (φ|)[1,1] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε(P ) ∪ Modε′(P ). Hence, φ
is true in all I ∈ IΦ such that I |= ε ∨ ε′ and Pr(I) > 0 for some model Pr of P . Thus,
(φ|)[1,1] is true in all Pr ∈ Modε∨ε′(P ).
Let s = me, and let Prme = me[P ]. Assume P‖∼ (φ|ε)[1,1] and P‖∼ (φ|ε′)[1,1],
which means Prme |= (φ|ε)[1,1] and Prme |= (φ|ε′). This implies Prme(ε ∧ ¬φ) =
Prme(ε′ ∧ ¬φ)= 0, and hence, Prme((ε ∨ ε′)∧¬φ) = 0. Therefore, Prme((ε ∨ ε′)∧ φ) =
Prme(ε ∨ ε′), i.e., Prme |= (φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1]. This shows P‖∼ (φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1]. 
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Proof of Theorem 5.7. In the framework of me- and mc-entailment, P‖ ¬(ε′|ε)[1,1]
is equivalent to P‖∼ (ε′|ε)[1,1], so Rational Monotonicity (RM) here is equivalent to
Cautious Monotonicity (CM). The assertion now follows with Theorem 5.6. 
Proof of Theorem 5.8. First, we consider the case of me-entailment. Set Prme = me[P ].
Then P‖∼me (φ|ε)[l, u] means Prme |= (φ|ε)[l, u]. Let HBΦ = HB1 ∪˙HB2 with HB2
containing the atoms occurring in ε′. Then all atoms occurring in ground(P ), ε and
φ will be in HB1. We will show Prme(φ|ε) = Prme(φ|ε ∧ ε′), which implies P‖∼me
(φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Prme fulfills some of the conditional constraints in P with equality (i.e., Prme(βi |αi)=
li , or Prme(βi |αi) = ui for some (βi |αi)[li , ui ] ∈ P ), and the other constraints with
inequality (i.e., Prme(βi |αi) ∈ (li, ui) for the other (βi |αi)[li , ui] ∈ P ) (see, e.g., [88]).
Only the conditionals of the first type are essential for computing Prme; we assume that











with suitable nonnegative factors α0, α+1 , α
−




m . Let ψ be an event no atom
of which occurs in ε′, that is, all atoms occurring in ψ lie within HB2, as do all atoms
occurring in φ1,ψ1, . . . , φm,ψm. Writing each I ∈ IΦ in the form I = I1 ∪ I2 with
I1 ⊆ HB1, I2 ⊆ HB2, we see that I |= ψ ∧ ε′ iff I1 |= ψ and I2 |= ε′, I |= φi ∧ ψi
(I |= φi ∧ ¬ψi , respectively) iff I1 |= φi ∧ ψi (I1 |= φi ∧ ¬ψi , respectively). Thus, we
obtain















































Therefore, Prme(ψ ∧ ε′) ∝ Prme(ψ) for each event ψ which has no atom in common
with ε′. In particular, by presupposition, φ and ε are such events. This implies
Prme(φ|ε ∧ ε′)= Pr
me(φ ∧ ε ∧ ε′)




which was to be shown.
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Now we deal with mc-entailment. P‖∼mc (φ|ε)[l, u] here means me[P ∪ CWA(P,
φ ∧ ε)] |= (φ|ε)[l, u]. It is to be proved that P‖∼mc (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u], i.e., that me[P ∪
CWA(P,φ ∧ ε ∧ ε′)] |= (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u]. Set
Pr∗1 = me
[














p ∈ HBΦ | ε′ |= p
}
.
By presupposition, no atom occurring in P,ε and φ also occurs in ε′. So we have
HB2 ∩ HB4 = ∅, and HB3 = HB2 ∪ HB4.
Due to the fact, that no atom of ε′ occurs in P , a conditional constraint in P is
essential for calculating Pr∗1 iff it is essential for calculating Pr∗2. Let (ψ1|φ1)[l1, u1], . . . ,
(ψm|φm)[lm,um] ∈ P be the conditional constraints in P which are essential for computing











α−i , if I ⊆ HB3,
0, otherwise,
where α+i = α1−xii , α−i = α−xii , xi ∈ {li , ui}, and the αi ’s, 1 i m, being solutions to the
equations






































β−i , if I ⊆ HB2,
0, otherwise,
where β+i = β1−xii , β−i = β−xii , xi ∈ {li , ui}, and the βi ’s, 1 i m, being solutions to
the equations



























α0 and β0 are obtained as normalizing constants.
First, we show that the two equational systems (B.1) and (B.2) are equivalent. For
I1, I2 ⊆ HB3, we define a relation ∼ by I1 ∼ I2 iff I1\HB4 = I2\HB4. Clearly, ∼ is an
equivalence relation, partitioning HB3 in equivalence classes, with exactly one J ⊆ HB2
in each equivalence class. For each such J ⊆ HB2, and for each I ⊆ HB3 with I ∼ J , we
have J |= φj ∧ ψ˙j iff I |= φj ∧ ψ˙j , with ψ˙j ∈ {ψj ,¬ψj }, for all 1 j m. This implies












































Thus, the factor 2card(HB4) is canceled in (B.1), which shows that in fact, (B.1) and (B.2)
are equivalent. Since the me-distributions do not depend upon a particular solution to (B.1)
and (B.2), respectively (see [39,41]), we may choose αi = βi for 1 i m; note, however,
that the normalizing constants α0 and β0 may differ.
Observing that each I ⊆ HB3 can be written as I = I1 ∪I2 with I1 ⊆ HB2 and I2 ⊆ HB4,
and that I |= φi ∧ ψ˙i iff I1 |= φi ∧ ψ˙i , and I |= φ ∧ ε ∧ ε′ iff I1 |= φ ∧ ε and I2 |= ε′ (i.e.,
I2 = HB4), we obtain


























= α0β−10 Pr∗2(φ ∧ ε).
In the same way, we calculate Pr∗1(ε ∧ ε′) = α0β−10 Pr∗2(ε). This proves Pr∗1(φ|ε ∧ ε′) =
Pr∗2(φ|ε). 
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Set P+ := P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}. We first consider the case of
me-entailment. Here, P‖∼me (ψ|φ)[l, u] means me[P ] |= (ψ|φ)[l, u]. We may now
argue similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.8, or we may use the property of system
independence [87] stating that learning conditional constraints with disjoint sets of atoms
yields statistical independence of these sets of atoms in the resulting me-distribution.
Hence, in the present case, me[P+] = me[P ] · me[{(β|α)[r, s]}], i.e., P ∗ = P ∗1 · P ∗2
with P ∗ := me[P+], P ∗1 := me[P ], and P ∗2 := me[{(β|α)[r, s]}], all distributions on
the obviously corresponding sets of atoms. This shows at once P ∗(ψ|φ) = P ∗1 (ψ|φ),
and P ∗(ψ|φ ∧ α) = P ∗1 (ψ|φ). Therefore, P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u] and P ∪{(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼ (ψ|φ ∧ α)[l, u], as desired.
Let us now consider the case of mc-entailment, that is, we have to take classical
approximations and the closed world assumptions into account. P‖∼mc (ψ|φ)[l, u] means
me[P ∪ CWA(P,φ ∧ψ)] |= (ψ|φ)[l, u]. Since no atom of α, β also occurs in ground(P ),
φ, ψ , we have CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ) = CWA(P,φ ∧ ψ) which makes the new constraint
(β|α)[x, y] vacuous for me-propagation, hence me[P+ ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ)] = me[P ∪
CWA(P,φ ∧ ψ)]. This shows P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼mc (ψ|φ)[l, u]. In order to prove the
second statement, we first note that CWA(P,φ ∧ ψ) = CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ ∧ α) ∪ {⊥ ⇐
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p | α ∧ β |= p}, where the union is disjoint. By system independence [87], me[P ∪
CWA(P,φ ∧ ψ)] = me[P ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ ∧ α)] · me[{⊥ ⇐ p | α ∧ β |= p}]. Set
P ∗1 := me[P ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ ∧ α)], taken as a distribution on all atoms except those
occurring in α, β . So, me[P ∪ CWA(P,φ ∧ψ)] |= (ψ|φ)[l, u] implies P ∗1 |= (ψ|φ)[l, u].
Again, by system independence, we further obtain P ∗ := me[P+ ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ ∧
α)] = me[P ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ ψ ∧ α) ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}] = me[P ∪ CWA(P+, φ ∧ψ ∧ α)] ·
me[{(β|α)[r, s]}] = P ∗1 · me[{(β|α)[r, s]}], hence P ∗(ψ|φ ∧ α) = P ∗1 (ψ|φ) ∈ [l, u]. This
proves that P ∪ {(β|α)[r, s]}‖∼mc (ψ|φ ∧ α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Lemma 5.10. Let (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ). Then, by Inclusion, P‖∼ (ψ|φ)[l, u].
Now, if ε ⇔ φ is logically valid, then LLE implies P‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l, u]. 
Proof of Theorem 5.11. Since all notions of entailment considered here satisfy LLE (cf.
Theorem 5.6), we only have to show that they also satisfy Inc. But this is obvious for ‖∼0,
‖∼me, and ‖∼mc. 
Proof of Theorem 5.12. Let P be a (conjunctive) probabilistic logic program, and let
(ψ|φ)[l, u] be a ground (conjunctive) conditional constraint. Assume P‖∼0 (ψ|φ)[l, u],
that is, every model of P satisfies (ψ|φ)[l, u]. Hence, as me[P ] and me[P ∪ CWA(P,
φ ∧ψ)] are models of P , they also satisfy (ψ|φ)[l, u]. That is, P‖∼s (ψ|φ)[l, u] for every
s ∈ {me,mc}. 
Proof of Theorem 5.13. (a) Assume first that s = me. Assume now that P‖∼0
(ψ|φ)[c, c]. That is, every model of P satisfies (ψ|φ)[c, c]. Thus, in particular, me[P ]
satisfies (ψ|φ)[c, c]. That is, P‖∼me (ψ|φ)[c, c]. Conversely, as shown by Paris and
Vencovska [68], the maximum entropy inference process satisfies the open-mindedness
principle. Applied to the framework of this paper, this principle says that P‖0 (ψ|φ)[c, c]
implies me[P ] 
|= (ψ|φ)[c, c], for all probabilistic logic programs P , and all ground
classical conditional constraints (ψ|φ)[c, c]. This shows that P‖∼me (ψ|φ)[c, c] implies
P‖∼0 (ψ|φ)[c, c].
Assume next that s = mc. By Theorem 3.2, it holds that P‖∼0 (ψ|φ)[c, c] iff
P ∪ CWA(P,ψ ∧ φ)‖∼0 (ψ|φ)[c, c]. As shown above, the latter is equivalent to P ∪
CWA(P,ψ ∧ φ)‖∼me (ψ|φ)[c, c], that is, P‖∼mc (ψ|φ)[c, c].
(b) Immediate by (a). 
Proof of Theorem 5.14. (a) It is easy to verify that every model Pr of P satisfies F iff
every model I ∈ IΦ of γ (P ) satisfies γ (F ). That is, P‖∼0 F iff γ (P ) |= γ (F ).
Assume now s ∈ {mc,me}. By Theorem 5.13, it holds that P‖∼s F iff P‖∼0 F . As
P‖∼0 F iff γ (P ) |= γ (F ), it thus follows that P‖∼s F iff γ (P ) |= γ (F ).
(b) For all s ∈ {0,me,mc}, it holds P‖∼stight F iff P‖∼s F and P‖s (φ|)[0,0]. Thus,
by (a), P‖∼stight F is equivalent to γ (P ) |= γ (F ) and γ (P ) 
|= ¬φ. 
194 G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 7Proof of Proposition 7.4. Observe first that the sets C and |[D]| can be computed in
linear time in the size of P . Algorithm index_set_2 from [55] reduces the computation
of RC(|[D]|) to O(|D||RC(|[D]|)|) satisfiability tests on classical logic programs of size up
to ‖P‖. Since each satisfiability test can be done in time O(‖P‖), it follows that RC(|[D]|)
can be computed in time O(|D|‖P‖|RC(|[D]|)|). 
Proof of Lemma 7.7. Due to Eqs. (1) and (2), for all possible worlds I ∈ IΦ with I |= C,
the following holds:









Assume now that I1, I2 ∈ IΦ with I1, I2 |= C∪{∧r} for some r ∈ R. Thus, for all ψ|φ ∈E,
it holds that (i) I1 |= ψ ∧ φ iff I2 |= ψ ∧ φ, (ii) I1 |= ¬ψ ∧ φ iff I2 |= ¬ψ ∧ φ, and (iii)
I1 |= ¬φ iff I2 |= ¬φ. By (C.1), it then follows me[P ](I1)= me[P ](I2). 
Proof of Theorem 7.8. Recall first that me[P ] is given by the optimal solution x
I (I ∈ IΦ )















(1 − l)xI  0







(u− 1)xI  0
(for all (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ),u < 1),
xI  0 (for all I ∈ IΦ). (C.2)
By Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, it is now sufficient to show that for every r ∈ R, it holds that
me[P ](∧r) = y
r , where y
r (r ∈ R) is the optimal solution of the following optimization












(1 − l)yr  0 (for all (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈D, l > 0),r∈R







(u− 1)yr  0 (for all (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D,u < 1),
yr  0 (for all r ∈R). (C.3)
We first show that (∗) for every solution xI (I ∈ IΦ ) of (C.2) such that
xI1 = xI2 for all I1, I2 ∈ IΦ with I1, I2 |=C ∪ {∧r} for some r ∈R, (C.4)





yr(logyr − logar). (C.5)
Let xI (I ∈ IΦ ) be a solution of (C.2) that satisfies (C.4). For every r ∈ R, we then define
yr = arxI , where I ∈ IΦ such that I |= C ∪ {∧r}. Then, yr (r ∈ R) is a solution of (C.3)
that satisfies (C.5).
We next prove that (∗∗) for every solution yr (r ∈R) of (C.3), there exists a solution xI
(I ∈ IΦ ) of (C.2) that satisfies (C.4) and (C.5). Let yr (r ∈ R) be a solution of (C.3). We
define xI = 0 for all I ∈ IΦ such that I 
|= C, and xI = yr/ar for all I ∈ IΦ and r ∈R such
that I |= C ∪ {∧r}. Then, xI (I ∈ IΦ ) is a solution of (C.2) that satisfies (C.4) and (C.5).
By (∗), (∗∗), and Lemma 7.7, the fact that (C.2) has a unique optimal solution x
I
(I ∈ IΦ ) implies that also (C.3) has a unique optimal solution y
r (r ∈ R). Moreover,
x
I = y
















r /ar = y
r . 
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 8
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Observe first that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, where n  0 such
that triv
C(D) = trivnC(D), it holds that every model of P ∪ triviC(D) is also a model of
P ∪ trivi+1C (D). Hence, every model of P is also a model of P
 = P ∪ triv
C(D). Thus,
P and P
 have exactly the same sets of models. This shows that P has a model Pr with
Pr(α) > 0 iff P
 has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8.3. As argued in the proof of Theorem 8.1, P and P
 have the
same sets of models. This already proves that for every s ∈ {0,me}, it holds that
P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u]. Recall then that P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪
CWA(P,β∧α)‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u]. Since CWA(P,β∧α) = CWA(P 
,β∧α), as easily seen,
it also follows that P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Proposition 8.4. Observe that n  |D| for the number n  0 such that
triv
C(D) = trivnC(D). Thus, triv
C(D) is computable by an iteration of at most |D| + 1
196 G. Kern-Isberner, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 139–202
steps. In iteration step i , we first compute trivi (D), which is the set of all (φ|)[0,0]C
such that either (i), or (ii), or (iii) holds relative to C ∪ trivi−1C (D), and then check
whether triviC(D) = trivi−1C (D). In the conjunctive case, the former can be done in time
O(‖P‖|D|2), while the latter is possible in time O(|D|). If triviC(D) = trivi−1C (D), then
the iteration stops and triv
C(D) = triviC(D). In summary, triv
C(D) can be computed in
time O(‖P‖|D|3). 
Proof of Theorem 8.5. Observe that each model of C is also a model of vacC(D). Hence,
each model of P
 = C ∪ (D − vacC(D)) is also a model of vacC(D) and thus of P . Thus,
P and P
 have exactly the same sets of models. This shows that P has a model Pr with
Pr(α) > 0 iff P
 has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8.7. As argued in the proof of Theorem 8.5, P and P
 have
the same sets of models. This already proves that for every s ∈ {0,me}, it holds
that P‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼stight (β|α)[l, u]. Recall then that P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u]
iff P ∪ CWA(P,β∧α)‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u]. Hence, to prove that P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff
P
‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u], it is sufficient to show that CWA(P,β∧α) = CWA(P 
,β∧α).
Observe first that (∗) C |= ψ ⇐ φ and C 
|= ⊥ ⇐ φ implies app(C) |= ψ ⇐ φ. Clearly,
every (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D with either (i), or (ii), or (iv) can be removed from ground(P )
without changing CWA(ground(P ),β ∧ α). By (∗), every (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D with (iii) can
also be removed without changing CWA(ground(P ),β ∧ α), since either C |= ⊥ ⇐ φ
or app(C) |= ψ ⇐ φ. Hence, CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(ground(P ),β ∧ α) = CWA(P 
,
β ∧ α), and thus P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Proposition 8.8. The set vacC(D) can be computed by checking for every
(ψ|ψ)[l, u] ∈ D whether a condition among (i)–(iv) is satisfied. In the ground conjunctive
case, each such check is possible in time O(‖P‖). In summary, vacC(D) can be computed
in time O(‖P‖|D|). 
Proof of Theorem 8.10. (⇒) We show that every model of P is also a model of
P
 = C ∪ actC,α(D). Let Pr be a model of P . In particular, Pr is a model of C and of
all members of D that are s-active w.r.t. P and α. We now show that Pr is also a model of
all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (∗) φ is s-active w.r.t. P and α, and (∗∗) (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D for some
l > 0 and some ψ that is s-inactive w.r.t. P and α. Towards a contradiction, assume that
Pr is not a model of some ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (∗) and (∗∗). Hence, C‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ, and thus
ψ ⇐ φ belongs to s-app(P ). But this contradicts ψ being s-inactive and φ being s-active
w.r.t. P and α. Hence, Pr is a model of all ⊥ ⇐ φ such that (∗) and (∗∗). In summary, Pr
is a model of P
.
(⇐) We show that for every model Pr
 of P
 = C ∪ actC,α(D), there exists a model Pr
of P such that (1) Pr(γ )= Pr
(γ ) for all ground events γ that are s-active w.r.t. P and α,
and (2) Pr(p) = 0 for all p ∈ HBΦ that are s-inactive w.r.t. P and α. Let Pr
 be a model of
P
. We define Pr by Pr(I) = Pr
(εI ) for all I ∈ IΦ with I 
|=p for all s-inactive p ∈ HBΦ ,
where εI is the conjunction of all s-active ground atoms q ∈ I and of all negations of s-
active ground atoms q /∈ I , and by Pr(I)= 0 for all other I ∈ IΦ . Then, Pr satisfies (1) and
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(2), and thus Pr is also a model of all F ∈ ground(P ) that are s-active w.r.t. P and α. We
now show that Pr is also a model of all s-inactive F ∈ ground(P ). Towards a contradiction,
assume that Pr is not a model of some s-inactive (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ). Thus, φ is s-
active, ψ is s-inactive, and l > 0. Hence, C‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ φ. Hence, Pr(φ) = Pr
(φ) = 0, but
this contradicts Pr not being a model of (ψ|φ)[l, u]. This shows that Pr is also a model of
all s-inactive F ∈ ground(P ). In summary, Pr is a model of P . 
Proof of Theorem 8.12. We define
R = {Pr(β|α) | Pr |= P,Pr(α) > 0}
and
R
 = {Pr(β|α) | Pr |= P
,Pr(α) > 0}.
As argued in the proof of Theorem 8.10, every model of P satisfies P
, and for every model
Pr
 of P
, there exists a model Pr of P such that Pr(γ )= Pr
(γ ) for all ground events γ
that are s-active w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. It thus follows R ⊆ R
 and R
 ⊆ R, respectively.
This already shows that P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u]. Recall then that
P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u]. We now prove that (∗)
CWA(P,β ∧ α) = CWA(P 
,β ∧ α). Clearly, CWA(P,β ∧ α) ⊆ CWA(P 
,β ∧ α), since
C‖∼0 ⊥ ⇐ φ for all s-active φ w.r.t. P and β ∧ α such that (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ) for
some l > 0 and some s-inactive ψ w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. To prove the converse, consider
some (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ ground(P ) such that l > 0, that P‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ, and that φ is s-inactive
w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Hence, φ is also inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Thus, ψ ⇐ φ in
app(P ) − app(P 
) does not have any influence on CWA(P,β ∧ α). Hence, CWA(P,
β ∧ α) ⊇ CWA(P 
,β ∧ α), and thus (∗) holds. By the proof of Theorem 8.10, every
model of P satisfies P
. Thus, (∗) implies that (∗∗) every model of P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α)
is also a model of P
 ∪ CWA(P 
,β ∧ α). We now show the converse, namely that (∗∗∗)
every model of P
 ∪ CWA(P 
,β ∧ α) is also a model of P ∪ CWA(P,β ∧ α). Towards
a contradiction, assume that there exists some model Pr of P
 ∪ CWA(P 
,β ∧ α) that is
not a model of some (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ D. Thus, (ψ|φ)[l, u] is s-inactive and thus also inactive
w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Hence, l > 0, φ is active, and ψ is inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Thus, φ
is s-active, and ψ is s-inactive w.r.t. P and β ∧ α. Hence, ⊥ ⇐ φ belongs to P
, and thus
Pr(φ) = 0, but this contradicts Pr not satisfying (ψ|φ)[l, u]. This shows that (∗∗∗) holds.
By (∗∗) and (∗∗∗), it thus follows that P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff P
‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u]. 
Proof of Proposition 8.13. We first compute s-app(P ). For each (ψ|φ)[l, u] ∈ P , we
decide whether l > 0 and C‖0 ⊥ ⇐ φ. This can be done in time O(‖P‖|P |). We then
compute the set of all ground atoms that are s-active w.r.t. P and α. This can be done in
time O(‖P‖ + ‖α‖). Once we are given the set of all ground atoms that are s-active w.r.t.
P and α, the set actC,α(D) can be computed in time O(‖P‖). In summary, computing
actC,α(D) can be done in time O(‖P‖|P | + ‖α‖). 
Proof of Theorem 8.14. (⇒) Every model Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0 is a model of C ∪D1
with Pr(α) > 0 and also a model of every C ∪Di with i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
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(⇐) For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Ci be the set of all F ∈ ground(C) defined over Hi . Assume
that (i) and (ii) hold. It follows that every Ci ∪Di with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} has a model Pri over
2Hi , where Pr1(α) > 0. Thus, the probabilistic interpretation Pr over 2HBP,α that is defined
by Pr(I) = Pr1(I1) · · ·Prk(Ik) for all I ∈ 2HBP,α , where Ii = I ∩Hi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
is a model of P with Pr(α) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8.16. (a) For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, denote by Ci the set of all members of
ground(C) that are defined over Hi . Assume that each C ∪ Di with i ∈ {2, . . . , k} is
satisfiable. We define




Pr(β|α) | Pr |= C ∪D1,Pr(α) > 0
}
.
Since every model Pr of P with Pr(α) > 0 is also a model of C ∪ D1 with Pr(α) > 0,
it follows that R ⊆ R1. To show the converse, assume that Pr is a model of C ∪ D1 with
Pr(α) > 0. Hence, there exists a model Pr1 of C1 ∪ D1 over 2H1 such that Pr1(α) > 0
and Pr1(β|α) = Pr(β|α). As each C ∪Di with i ∈ {2, . . . , k} is satisfiable, every Ci ∪Di
with i ∈ {2, . . . , k} has a model Pri over 2Hi . Thus, the probabilistic interpretation Pr′
over 2HBP,β∧α that is defined by Pr′(I) = Pr1(I1) · · ·Prk(Ik) for all I ∈ 2HBP,β∧α , where
Ii = I∩Hi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, is a model of P with Pr′(β|α) = Pr1(β|α) = Pr(β|α)
and Pr′(α) = Pr1(α) > 0. This shows that R ⊇ R1. In summary, it holds that R = R1.
It thus follows that P‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u] iff C ∪ D1‖∼0tight (β|α)[l, u]. By the proof of
Theorem 8.14, it holds that P has a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0 iff C ∪ D1 has such
a model. Thus, P‖∼stight (β|α)[1,0] iff C ∪ D1‖∼stight (β|α)[1,0] for all s ∈ {me,mc}.
Assume now that P and C ∪ D1 have a model Pr with Pr(α) > 0. Observe then that,
me[P ](I) =∏ki=1 mei [Ci ∪ Di ](εi) for all I ∈ 2HBP,β∧α , where εi is the conjunction of
all p ∈ I ∩ Hi and all negations of p /∈ I ∩ Hi , and mei is the me-model over 2Hi , for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; this relationship is known as “system independence” from [87]. It then
follows that me[P ](β|α)= me[C1 ∪D1](β|α), and also that me[C ∪D1](β|α)= me[C1 ∪
D1](β|α). In summary, me[P ](β|α)= me[C ∪D1](β|α), and thus P‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u] iff
C∪D1‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u]. Recall then that P‖∼mc (β|α)[l, u] iff P ∪CWA(P,β∧α) ‖∼metight
(β|α)[l, u]. The latter is equivalent to
C ∪D1 ∪ CWA(C ∪D1, β ∧ α)‖∼metight (β|α)[l, u],
since CWA(P,β ∧ α) and CWA(C ∪ D1, β ∧ α) coincide on their restriction to H1. We
have thus proved that P‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u] iff C ∪D1‖∼mctight (β|α)[l, u].
(b) If some C ∪ Di with i ∈ {2, . . . , k} is not satisfiable, then P is not satisfiable, and
thus P‖∼stight (β|α)[1,0] for all s ∈ {0,me,mc}. 
Proof of Proposition 8.17. We first compute the set S of all connected components of the
hypergraph
G= (V ,E) = (HBP,α,{At(F ) | F ∈ P} ∪ {At(α)}),
where At(F ) denotes the set of all ground atoms p ∈ HBP that occur in F . This set S can
be computed in linear time using standard methods and data structures. Once S is given,
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decC,α(D) and relC,α(D) can be computed in linear time. In summary, decC,α(D) and
relC,α(D) can be computed in linear time. 
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